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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to bring attention to the ways in which the effects of hate speech-specifically racialized hate speech--transcends digital platforms. It will begin by connecting the
phenomenon of racialized hate speech on Facebook to specific psychological tendencies that the
company consciously amplifies for its own financial benefit. The first chapter interrogates the
common narrative that violent rhetoric indicates a flaw in the platform’s design, instead arguing
that proliferation of such content is encouraged by Facebook’s algorithm. From there, the second
chapter examines what happens when a technology giant leverages human psychology for
corporate greed. A true worst-case scenario, the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar elucidates
Facebook’s negligent behavior and illustrates the consequences of failing to proactively mitigate
hate speech. Finally, the third chapter discusses existing and proposed efforts to regulate
Facebook and similar platforms. As an issue that encompasses ethical dilemmas, policy
predicaments, and business implications, reducing the prevalence of racialized hate speech on
Facebook poses challenges for all regulatory actors, from the United Nations, to sovereign states,
to the corporation itself. In the end, the most effective means of protecting human rights on
digital networks may not rest upon the United Nations, nor individual nations, nor private
corporations, but upon social media users themselves.
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INTRODUCTION
I was born at the turn of the millennium, in the midst of Y2K paranoia. The rapid change
of technology has defined my entire generation, for within our short lifetimes we have witnessed
the invention of everything from wifi, to smartphones, to cryptocurrency. Though these
transformations have certainly changed the physical objects in our lives, they have also
fundamentally altered our social relationships. Technology enables us to transcend the
boundaries of time and space; people can interact with individuals from other continents, and
even from distant points in their past.
This hyperconnectivity exponentially increased with the advent of social media. In 2012,
a piercing shriek shattered the tranquility of my childhood home, drawing my family into the
room where my older sister sat glued to our old PC monitor. She had recently made an account
on a new website called ‘Facebook,’ and received a highly unexpected friend request. My family
had a running joke for years about one Federico Vargas, 1 a kindergarten classmate of my sister
who committed the unforgivable sin of eating her coloring crayons on the first day of school.
Twelve years and hundreds of miles later, Federico and Amy had found each other on Facebook.
They chatted back and forth for a bit, and though he claimed not to remember the incriminating
incident, he did promise her a consolatory box of crayons.
It was wholesome, serendipitous interactions such as this one that defined Facebook in its
early years. Thousands, then millions, and now billions of people flock to the platform every day
for everything from news to entertainment, relegating digitized social interaction from a novelty
to a normality. In fact, I, as someone with virtually no social media footprint, regularly receive

1. Federico’s name has been changed to respect his privacy.
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strange looks, surprised exclamations, and occasionally scornful derision when people discover I
do not and have never had an account on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, TikTok, and the like.
I am no luddite—I recognize the potential for positive change that Facebook and its kin
possess. Around the time my middle school classmates began making social media profiles, prodemocracy protesters throughout the Middle East and North Africa used those same platforms to
organize the Arab Spring. A study by the University of Washington finds that social media in
general and Facebook in particular facilitated and enhanced the scope, reach, and efficacy of the
movement. The platform’s algorithms and broad network allowed messages of justice to spread
quickly and widely; “evidence suggests that social media carried a cascade of messages about
freedom and democracy across North Africa and the Middle East, and helped raise expectations
for the success of political uprising.” 2 Videos depicting protests went viral, and opposition
Facebook pages gained thousands upon thousands of followers. Social justice activists around
the world learned from the Arab Spring’s strategy, utilizing social media’s virality and
decentralization to demand transparency and hold those in power accountable. These tactics are
not deployed only in ‘distant lands,’ either. I have called the Twin Cities home for four years, a
period strongly shaped by protest movements like Black Lives Matter and Stop Line 3.
Organizers routinely use Facebook and Instagram not only to raise awareness for their causes,
but also to capture injustices, communicate actions, and share safety tips. Modern social justice
campaigns cannot be divorced from social media platforms.

2. Catherine O’Donnell, “New Study Quantifies Use of Social Media in Arab Spring,” University of
Washington News, September 12, 2011, https://www.washington.edu/news/2011/09/12/new-study-quantifies-use-ofsocial-media-in-arab-spring/.
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However, the higher the pedestal, the harder the fall. Over the last five years, Facebook
has weathered scandal after scandal, drawing criticism for everything from its mismanagement
of user data, to the proliferation of misinformation, to damning allegations of human rights
abuse. The company’s tumble from grace gained real momentum in 2018 with the revelation of
the Cambridge Analytica scandal. To give Donald Trump an edge in the 2016 US presidential
election, the titular political consulting firm conspired with Facebook to mine the data of over 50
million users without their knowledge or permission. 3 It raised an alarming question: how much
would Facebook sacrifice at the altar of profit?
Just a few years later, whistleblower Francis Haugen leaked internal corporate documents
to the Wall Street Journal detailing even more damning transgressions. The Facebook Files, as
they came to be known, testify that the company regularly values company growth over user
wellbeing. 4 Executives make conscious and repeated decisions to maximize revenue even when
doing so comes at the expense of truth, equality, and safety on their platform, especially for those
who possess marginalized and/or minority identities. Among other issues, the documents
highlighted the prevalence and effects of hate speech on Facebook.
Of course, you don’t need to read secret company memorandums to realize that the
platform hosts a truly frightening amount of bigotry and vitriol—anyone with a Facebook
account knows that. The depth and extent of that content’s impact, however, may not be

3. Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore, and Carole Cadwalladr. “How Trump Consultants Exploited
the Facebook Data of Millions.” The New York Times, March 17, 2018.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html.
4. Lima, Cristiano. “A Whistleblower’s Power: Key Takeaways from the Facebook Papers.” The
Washington Post, October 26, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/25/what-are-thefacebook-papers/.
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immediately apparent to the average user. Prejudicial language that originates on online
platforms can nevertheless precipitate offline consequences. We as a society are only just
beginning to grasp the tangible implications of digital social dynamics and what they mean for
personal safety and collective wellbeing. After all, not every Facebook user is as wellintentioned as Federico Vargas.
This project began as an attempt to compile an encyclopedic account of Facebook’s
sordid relationship with human rights, everything from privacy to censorship to hate speech.
However, I soon realized that such an endeavor could consume an entire career; the tech giant’s
litany of transgressions stretches so long that any singular attempt to catalog them would be
doomed to obsolescence or incompletion or both. So, I chose to narrow my scope and focus
specifically on hate speech. Yet even that proved too vast a topic, encompassing discrimination
against every identity, characteristic, or affiliation a person could possibly possess. Ultimately,
current events guided this thesis to its final subject. The last few years have seen a spate of
attacks against people of Asian descent as a misinformed backlash against the COVID-19
pandemic; rampant police brutality against Black folks and harsh crackdowns against those who
dare speak out against it; state-sponsored desecration of Indigenous lives and land. These
injustices feel particularly acute in the Twin Cities, but repeat and reverberate across the world.
Racist violence both feeds off and feeds into racist rhetoric online. World leaders employ
racially-coded dog whistles in official posts and supremacist groups flourish, finding refuge in
the murky realm of cyberspace and utilizing social media platforms to espouse bigoted
disinformation. Nowhere do such antagonists seem to feel more at home than Facebook.
Yet common discourse often dissociates physical action, virtual speech, and the social
media platforms that link the two. This thesis seeks to bring attention to the ways in which the
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effects of hate speech—specifically racialized 5 hate speech—transcend digital platforms. As with
all discussions regarding bigoted or inflammatory language, the issue of hate speech on
Facebook complicates the ostensibly universal right to free expression. Should individuals who
express racist, misogynist, or otherwise prejudicial views be protected from censorship or
punishment? A landmark decision in this legal quandary has its origins in the Twin Cities, in
fact. The 1992 Supreme Court case R.A.V. v. St. Paul concerned an incident in which a young
man named Robert A. Viktora burned a cross in the yard of a Black family who lived nearby.
However, the Supreme Court was not interested in the legal or moral significance of crossburning; rather, they took issue with the St. Paul ordinance that Viktora was on trial for violating.
The City of St. Paul forbade placing swastikas or a burning cross anywhere “in an attempt to
arouse anger or alarm on the basis of race, color, creed, or religion,” a law the Supreme Court
struck down as unconstitutionally content-based. 6 According to Justice Scalia’s opinion, the
ordinance impermissibly discriminated against Viktora’s speech solely because of the sentiment
it expressed. Subsequent related decisions carved out narrow exemptions in the R.A.V. ruling,
allowing content-based censorship for “exceptionally virulent” forms of discriminatory
expression or speech that poses a “true threat.” 7

5. For the purposes of this paper, racialization refers to the process by which ‘racial meaning’ is assigned to
a person, practice, relationship, or social group. It draws on the work of Bianca Gonzalez-Sobrino, particularly her
2018 article entitled “Exploring the Mechanisms of Racialization beyond the Black-White Binary”
(https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2018.1444781). Following her approach, this paper also refers to racialization
beyond the constructed black-white binary so common in the United States, and recognizes that ‘race’ is not a valid
scientific category, nor a static and immutable identity; rather, it is a process imbricated with power and privilege.
Used here, racialized hate speech refers to language that expresses prejudice or abuse towards an individual or
collection of individuals based on their (perceived) racial or ethnic differences.
6. David A. May, “R.A.V. v. St. Paul (1992),” The First Amendment Encyclopedia, accessed March 26,
2022, https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/270/r-a-v-v-st-paul.
7. Robert A. Kahn, “Virginia v. Black (2003),” The First Amendment Encyclopedia, accessed March 26,
2022, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/271/virginia-v-black.
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Yet these categories remain largely ambiguous, particularly in the virtual world. Does a
tweet announcing that “when the looting starts, the shooting starts” represent a true threat? 8 Is a
Facebook group for white supremacists an exceptionally virulent form of discriminatory
expression? Would a social media company’s policy banning racial slurs comprise an
unconstitutionally content-based limitation of free speech? Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
established legal precedent for restricting so-called “fighting words” meant to incite violence, a
designation that would certainly seem to apply to racialized hate speech on digital platforms. 9
However, just seven years later, the 1949 Terminiello v. Chicago case constricted the definition
of fighting words to encompass only expressions that create a “clear and present danger.” 10 This
suggests that fighting words cannot exist on social media. After all, if only ‘sticks and stones’
can break bones, what threat could virtual words possibly pose?
As this paper will demonstrate, hate speech on social media can incite real violence, with
consequences that stretch far beyond the ethereality of cyberspace. Facebook’s vision of an
inextricably interconnected world—the very vision that secured the company’s social,
commercial, and technological dominance—may endanger the safety and wellbeing of
marginalized groups. Yet heavy-handed regulation of social media content could easily engender
the same problems; censorship seldom benefits minorities. With corporations like Facebook 11

8. Donald Trump, Twitter post, May 28, 2020. Due to the suspension of Trump’s Twitter account, the
original tweet is unavailable.
9. “Fighting Words.” Legal Information Institute, accessed March 26, 2022.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fighting_words#:~:text=Fighting%20words%20are%20words%20meant,immediat
e%20breach%20of%20the%20peace.
10. Ibid.
11. On October 28, 2021 CEO Mark Zuckerberg announced that Facebook, the company known for its
titular platform as well as Messenger, Instagram, and WhatsApp, would be rebranded as ‘Meta.’ This change
happened in the midst of writing and is not reflected throughout the paper. Instead, ‘Facebook’ will refer here to
both the platform and the larger corporation.
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already entrenched within both the global economy and the global psyche, humanity is left
retroactively scrambling to determine how to design, resource, and regulate social media so as to
maximize its benefits while mitigating its harms. This thesis seeks to establish the salience of
these issues, exploring how the tangible impacts of Facebook’s underlying architecture cause
violence to racial(ized) minorities across the world. It will begin by connecting the phenomenon
of racialized hate speech on Facebook to specific psychological tendencies that the company
consciously amplifies for its own financial benefit. The first chapter interrogates the common
narrative that violent rhetoric indicates a flaw in the platform’s design, instead arguing that
proliferation of such content is encouraged by Facebook’s algorithm. From there, the second
chapter examines what happens when a technology giant leverages human psychology for
corporate greed. A true worst-case scenario, the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar elucidates
Facebook’s negligent behavior and illustrates the consequences of failing to proactively mitigate
hate speech. Finally, the third chapter discusses existing and proposed efforts to oversee
Facebook and similar platforms. As an issue that encompasses ethical dilemmas, policy
predicaments, and business implications, reducing the prevalence of racialized hate speech on
Facebook poses challenges for all regulatory actors, from the United Nations, to sovereign states,
to the corporation itself. In the end, the most effective means of protecting human rights on
digital networks may not rest upon the United Nations, nor individual nations, nor private
corporations, but upon social media users themselves.
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CHAPTER ONE:
ORIGINS OF RACIALIZED HATE SPEECH ON FACEBOOK
Few successful decisions ever begin with a Tuesday night bender in a college dorm room.
Yet those are the humble origins of Facebook, which began when founder and CEO Mark
Zuckerberg decided to create a forum for his fellow Harvard students to rate the attractiveness of
their female classmates. 1 The result, FaceMash, materialized at a time when “a new kind of
Internet [was] emerging — one more about connecting people to people than people to
Websites.” 2 Sure enough, Zuckerberg’s creation underwent rapid expansion before going public
in 2012, less than a decade after its conception. At $104 billion, Facebook boasted the largest
technology IPO in history, and the third-largest IPO of any industry, ever. 3 Much of the
company’s appeal stemmed from its competitive streak and innovative edge, characteristics that
define it to this day.
But the very qualities that enabled Facebook’s evolution from nihility to ubiquity possess
darker sides as well. Moral frameworks cannot keep up with the rate of technological
advancement, leaving society to reactively grapple with unforeseen consequences. In the last
several years especially, Facebook has come under intense scrutiny for the ethical implications of
its business practices. The Cambridge Analytica scandal that came to light in 2018 opened the
world’s eyes to the cooptation of user data, and censorship issues in nations like Thailand,
Russia, and China have raised questions of complicity with authoritarian regimes. However, in

1. Sheera Frenkel and Cecilia Kang, An Ugly Truth, (New York: Harper Collins, 2021).
2. Claire Hoffman, “The Battle for Facebook,” Rolling Stone, September 15, 2010,
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/the-battle-for-facebook-242989/l.
3. Julianne Pepitone, “Facebook Trading Sets Record IPO Volume,” CNN Money, May 18, 2012,
https://money.cnn.com/2012/05/18/technology/facebook-ipo-trading/index.htm.
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addition to violating human rights such as those of privacy and expression, Facebook has also
served as a platform where hate speech can flourish.
HATE SPEECH
Though a seemingly straightforward concept, hate speech as a legal category actually
remains quite ambiguous. In fact, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on free expression
observed in a 2019 report that no definition for it exists within conventional international law. 4
The United States fails to define hate speech as well, though the Federal Bureau of Investigation
does delineate hate crimes. 5 As the federal webpage on the subject reminds its viewers, “hate
itself is not a crime—and the FBI is mindful of protecting freedom of speech and other civil
liberties.” 6 In lieu of a legal consensus, Facebook has decided its own corporate definition. Hate
speech, according to Facebook’s Community Standards, consists of a “direct attack against
people…on the basis of…protected characteristics: race, ethnicity, national origin, disability,
religious affiliation, caste, sexual orientation, sex, gender identity, and serious disease.” 7 Yet this
black-and-white explanation belies vast swaths of gray area subject to seemingly arbitrary
regulation. A ProPublica investigation revealed that Facebook “gives users broader latitude when
they write about ‘subsets’ of protected categories. White men are considered a group because

4. United Nations General Assembly, Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression, A/74/486, October 9, 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/A_74_486.pdf.
5. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Hate Crimes,” accessed September 18, 2021,
https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/civil-rights/hate-crimes.
6. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Hate Crimes.”
7. Meta, “Hate Speech,” accessed May 22, 2021,
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/hate_speech.
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both traits are protected, while female drivers and black children…[are] not protected.” 8 Amidst
this opacity, hate speech flourishes on the platform. Approximately 5 million posts are flagged as
hate speech every single day, and that only counts content that violates Facebook’s own
narrowly-defined Community Standards. 9 The real number, asserts the Anti-Defamation League,
is likely far higher.
What, then, allows for this proliferation? According to its mission statement, Facebook
strives to “give people the power to build community and bring the world closer together.” 10
Derogatory, intimidating, and exclusive language antithesizes that mission; by the company’s
own admission, “people [can] use their voice and connect more freely when they don't feel
attacked on the basis of who they are.” 11 If Facebook is committed to connecting the world, why
does its platform foster virulent hate speech that divides rather than unites? In this section, I will
argue that violations of human rights—particularly inflammatory hate speech targeting racial
minorities—do not constitute a failure of Facebook’s technology. Rather, it is a consequence of
the company’s very business model, which intentionally preys upon human psychology in order
to maximize profits. In short, racialized hate speech is a predictable, inevitable byproduct of
Facebook’s success.

8. Julia Angwin and Hannes Grassegger, “Facebook’s Secret Censorship Rules Protect White Men From
Hate Speech But Not Black Children,” ProPublica, June 28, 2017, https://www.propublica.org/article/facebookhate-speech-censorship-internal-documents-algorithms.
9. Anti-Defamation League, “Facebook’s Hate Speech Problem is Even Bigger Than We Thought,”
accessed September 18, 2021, https://www.adl.org/blog/facebooks-hate-speech-problem-is-even-bigger-than-wethought.
10. Meta, “Our Mission,” accessed March 15, 2022, https://about.facebook.com/company-info/.
11. Meta, “Hate Speech.”
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ATTENTION ECONOMY
Facebook exists in a fundamentally different ecosystem than did its media ancestors.
People today face an inundation of information to sift through, bombarded from all sides by
largely irrelevant content. In such an environment, attention is in short supply. Economist and
cognitive psychologist Herbert Simon first observed this phenomenon in 1971 when he wrote,
“The wealth of information means a dearth of something else: a scarcity of whatever it is that
information consumes. What information consumes is rather obvious: it consumes the attention
of its recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention.” 12 This
understanding of consumers’ very attention as a scarce resource held profound economic
implications, particularly at the turn of the century as the Internet made more information more
accessible than ever before. In 1997, Goldhaber argued that “If the Web and the Net can be
viewed as spaces in which we will increasingly live our lives, the economic laws we will live
under have to be natural to this new space.” 13 These new economic laws treat attention as capital,
a valuable commodity that can be traded, bought, and sold.
Perhaps no company has capitalized on the commodification of attention better than
Facebook. Myllylahti asserts that “user attention has become a currency on the platform,” a
resource that Facebook possesses in abundance and trades with other corporations for more
traditional tender. This constitutes the cornerstone of the platform’s business model. Facebook’s
services, after all, remain free to use; rather than paying cash to post, like, and share, users

12. Herbert A. Simon, et al., “Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World,” Computers,
Communication, and the Public Interest (1971): 40.
13. Michael H. Goldhaber, “The Attention Economy and the Net,” First Monday 2, no. 4 (April 1997):
https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v2i4.519.
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“exchange their time [and] attention…for access to Facebook’s services.” 14 Major corporations
from Coca-Cola to Walmart to Microsoft will pay for that time and attention—known in the
industry as “eyeballs,”—forking over billions of dollars for the right to post their advertisements
on Facebook pages. The more eyeballs a page receives, the more valuable it is to the company
trying to hold users’ attention—and the more lucrative it is for Facebook. This attention
economy, notes technologist Tobias Rose-Stockwell, bears a single-minded focus on the metric
of ‘engagement,’ defined as the means “by which companies evaluate the number of clicks,
likes, shares, and comments associated with their content.” 15 A Facebook page with a high
degree of engagement by definition has a high number of people viewing it, and therefore a large
audience for potential advertisers. Such a page represents a veritable jackpot for Facebook, as
companies will spend more money on advertisements that more people will see. It is the virtual
equivalent of renting a billboard on the freeway versus one on a country backroad. Facebook,
therefore, designs its algorithms to boost content that will maximize user engagement—and
corporate profits.
NEGATIVITY BIAS
The type of content most likely to go viral and maximize ad revenue is not, however, as
innocuous as cat videos or reaction memes. Instead, posts containing controversial opinions,
inflammatory rhetoric, or divisive language receive significantly more engagement, capturing
user attention in a way that more positive posts cannot. Known as negativity bias, this proclivity
is well-documented in psychological studies. Fiske and Ohira both demonstrate that stimuli

14. Frenkel and Kang, An Ugly Truth, 3.
15. Tobias Rose-Stockwell, “This is How Your Fear and Rage are Being Shared for Profit,” Quartz, July
28, 2017, https://qz.com/1039910/how-facebooks-news-feed-algorithm-sells-our-fear-and-outrage-for-profit/.
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associated with negative words or attributes prompt higher levels and duration of cognitive
processes, including attention. 16 There is “a tendency for negative events to result in a greater
mobilization of an organism’s psychological, cognitive, emotional, and social responses.” 17
Negativity bias possesses significant evolutionary utility; organisms that devote more mental
resources to information regarding a potential threat are more able to fight or flee if that threat
manifests. The zebra that pays attention to a suspicious movement in the grass will likely outlive
the zebra that only pays attention to eating the grass. As Berggren notes, “threat stimuli are not
just prioritized when competing for attention, but also able to ‘hold’ attention post-capture.” 18
Thus, the bias enables negative stimuli to capture attention more readily as well as retain it.
Though humans have left the savannah and fears of predation in our evolutionary past,
our brains remain hardwired to latch onto information and stimuli that evokes threat-induced
emotional responses. A team of Finnish psychologists demonstrated how the negativity bias
influences what media people prioritize in situations with multiple sources competing for their
attention. Negative tweets, they found, “draw more gaze dwell time and are recognized better

16. S. T. Fiske, “Attention and Weight in Person Perception: The Impact of Negative and Extreme
Behavior,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38 no. 6, (1980): 889–906, https://doi.org/10.1037/00223514.38.6.889; Hideki Ohira, “Eyeblink Activity in a Word-Naming Task as a Function of Semantic Priming and
Cognitive Load,” Perceptual and Motor Skills 82, no. 3 (June 1996): 835–42,
https://doi.org/10.2466/pms.1996.82.3.835.
17. Tiffany A. Ito et al., “Negative Information Weighs More Heavily on the Brain: The Negativity Bias in
Evaluative Categorizations,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75, no. 4 (1998): 1,
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.4.887.
18. Nick Berggren, “Rapid Attentional Biases to Threat-Associated Visual Features: The Roles of Anxiety
and Visual Working Memory Access,” Emotion, (June 2020): 2, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/emo0000761.
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than positive tweets.” 19 This suggests that people will direct more thought and attention to
negative information even in online environments that pose no real, physical threat to them.
NEWS FEED ALGORITHM
Of course, the Finnish study’s findings apply beyond Twitter. The psychological
gravitation towards fear-, disgust-, or rage-inducing content is not lost on Facebook, which
recognizes that it can manipulate this adaptive biological mechanism to make money. It does this
primarily through its News Feed, a brilliant and secretive algorithmic masterpiece that serves
customized content to every user. As Christopher Mims of the Wall Street Journal explains,
“Every time one of Facebook's two billion monthly users opens the Facebook app, a
personalization algorithm sorts through all the posts that a person could theoretically see, and
dishes up the fraction it thinks she or he would like to see first.” 20 If a person likes a lot of posts
about home gardening, for instance, their News Feed would likely contain more content about
tomatoes, soil, or plants than about tacos, skateboarding, or pianos. The feature is meant to
increase time spent on the platform by keeping its users happy and engaged.
Engineers at Facebook constantly make tweaks to the News Feed algorithm in order to
further optimize it, but occasionally their changes cause massive ripple effects. In 2015, the
company altered its entire metric of user activity, moving away from the assumption that more
clicks indicated higher engagement. They switched instead to a model that stressed time spent on
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a post or page, believing it would mitigate the prevalence of clickbait articles. 21 Spam sites,
however, would have been preferable to the actual consequences of the algorithmic shift. Primed
by their neurological biases, people tended to spend more time on sensationalized and salacious
content, prompting their News Feeds to display more of that ilk in a self-perpetuating cycle of
negativity. Facebook users were indeed more engaged than ever, but they were also angrier and
more fearful than ever.
After a particularly dismal fiscal year for the company, the News Feed underwent another
overhaul in 2018. Engineers reconfigured the algorithm to emphasize what they called
Meaningful Social Interaction (MSI), a formulaic of both intimacy and engagement, quantified
and compiled into a tidy score. Intimacy measures closeness, or how connected one user is
through another as indicated by mutual friends and interaction with one another on the platform.
Engagement, on the other hand, tracks activity such as likes, comments, and shares. 22 A post that
received, say, 3000 likes and 500 comments from a person with 150 mutual friends would
receive a greater MSI score than a post from a stranger that generated only a handful of likes,
and therefore show up in a more prioritized position on one’s News Feed.
But what happens when these measures are at odds with each other? Which deserves
algorithmic privilege: an uncommented post from a close friend or a viral post from a random
user? Facebook’s leaders decided that in the contest between intimacy and engagement, the latter
wins out. The negativity bias reared its ugly head here as well, for the content that receives the
most engagement is also likely to be the most inflammatory, triggering users’ predilection to
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favor threatening stimuli with their attention. Sure enough, “people inside of Facebook started to
notice that [the News Feed] was effectively highlighting the very worst kind of content[:] stuff
that was divisive, really negative, and just represented the worst parts of humanity.” 23 This effect
was exacerbated by another aspect of the News Feed update. MSI does not merely retroactively
suggest popular content, it actively anticipates what will be popular in the future and boosts it to
get the ball rolling. Known as Downstream MSI, this program uses artificial intelligence (AI) to
identify posts that possess trending potential and then bumps them up towards the top of people’s
News Feeds to attract a critical mass of attention, initiating a self-fulfilling prophecy of virality.
Years of data have taught the AI that the content most likely to capture attention is negative,
suggestive of some kind of threat or conflict. Media reporter Keach Hagey summarizes the
repercussions of this algorithm:
“[Downstream MSI is] a really different way of filtering what you see. It’s not based on
what you would actually most like to see or what’s most relevant to you or what’s highest
quality. It’s what will get the most comments. And the result of that, it turns out that what gets
the most comments is really divisive, outrageous stuff, especially stuff that provokes political
anger.” 24
In applying sophisticated technology to base biological impulses, Facebook has given renewed
life to the old journalist adage “if it bleeds, it reads.”
ETHICAL FAILURE, CORPORATE SUCCESS
The unspoken corollary to that adage, of course, is “if it reads, it makes us money.”
Facebook designs its algorithms to amplify popular or trending content, attracting ever-greater
attention to a particular page or post and making it a hot commodity in the attention economy.
Competing for this scarce resource, companies will pay Facebook lots of money to capitalize on
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that captivated attention and run advertisements. Due to humans’ psychological negativity bias,
controversial, inflammatory, and/or derogatory content garners more attention; thus, such content
is actually worth more money. As Sheera Frenkel and Cecilia Kang write in their exposé of
Facebook, “the platform is built upon a fundamental possibly irreconcilable dichotomy: its
purported mission to advance society by connecting people while also profiting off of them.” 25
Facebook possesses a financial incentive to promote hate speech—or, at the very least, to not
intervene in instances of hate speech on its platform. Taking down or suppressing hate speech,
therefore, may run counter to Facebook’s entire purpose as a corporation: to maximize profits.
The contradiction between monetary success and ethical integrity has not escaped the
attention of Facebook’s leadership. When the company implemented its Meaningful Social
Interaction update, it convened a Civic Team to assess the new algorithm’s impact on
misinformation and political speech. According to internal documents obtained by the Wall
Street Journal, the team discovered that MSI actively promoted the platform’s most radical, toxic
content. To further complicate matters, the worse the content, the more often it was shared. “So
if a thing's been reshared 20 times in a row,” explains the Journal’s lead reporter, Jeff Horowitz,
“it's going to be 10x or more likely to contain nudity, violence, hate speech, misinformation, than
a thing that has just been not reshared at all.” 26 Confronted with this damning revelation, founder
and CEO Mark Zuckerberg agreed to scale back the MSI algorithm—but only in very particular
places or pertaining to very particular content. The Civic Team compiled a long list of potential
solutions ranging from diminishing platform speed, to capping daily group invitations, to
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removing the reshare button entirely. Ultimately, Facebook declined to adopt any of these
measures; corporate leadership deemed them too detrimental to business. 27
Samidh Chakrabarti, leader of the since-disbanded Civic Team, has argued that valuing
all user engagement regardless of its substance will “Invariably amplify…sensationalism, hate
and other societal harms…. [It] is so predictable that it is perhaps a natural law of social
networks.” 28 Yet despite this inevitability, Facebook has chosen again and again to protect its
bottom line at the cost of human security. In defending this decision, COO Sheryl Sandberg and
other spokespeople repeatedly appeal to the sanctity of freedom of expression. “More people
being able to share their experiences and perspectives has always been necessary to build a more
inclusive society,” Zuckerberg maintained in a much-derided speech at Georgetown
University. 29 This rhetoric buttresses Facebook’s perennial claim that it serves merely as a
platform, not a publisher. According to its own self-mythology, the company simply stores and
provides information in an objective, unbiased manner without intermediating between content
and users. Zuckerberg even attempted to make the bold and entirely implausible argument that
Facebook is “not a media company.” 30 In reality, of course, the platform constantly shapes,
influences, and defines the experience of everyone engaging with it. As international human
rights lawyer Jenny Domino notes, “Though platforms seem to only ‘facilitate’ expression, there

27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Molla, Rani, “Mark Zuckerberg Said a Lot of Nothing in His Big Speech,” Vox, October 17, 2019,
https://www.vox.com/2019/10/17/20919505/mark-zuckerberg-georgetown-free-speech-facebook.
30. Jeffrey Herbst, "The Algorithm is an Editor; Google, Facebook and Other Tech Companies Say They
Aren't News Organizations, but the Claim is Becoming Increasingly Implausible," Wall Street Journal
(Online), April 13, 2016, https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/algorithm-is-editor-google-facebook-othertech/docview/1780643099/se-2?accountid=12205.

23

is nothing neutral about the curating, filtering, and ‘orchestrating’ of posted content that they
take on.” 31 Facebook constantly makes decisions about allowable content based on what will
yield the greatest profit irrespective of that content’s impact on its users.
COMMUNITY STANDARDS
It justifies these decisions with a convoluted web of capricious rules and arbitrary
guidelines known as Community Standards, which everyone with a Facebook account must
consent to. They function as the platform’s human rights doctrine—albeit an ad hoc, reactive,
inconsistently enforced doctrine. As discussed previously, Facebook defines hate speech as a
“direct attack against people…on the basis of…protected characteristics: race, ethnicity, national
origin, disability, religious affiliation, caste, sexual orientation, sex, gender identity, and serious
disease.” 32 Direct attacks themselves, according to the Community Standards, consist of “violent
or dehumanizing speech, harmful stereotypes, statements of inferiority, expressions of contempt,
disgust or dismissal, cursing and calls for exclusion or segregation.” 33 Content that fits within
this broad definition falls into one of three tiers of escalating severity. The third tier includes
calls for segregation and/or exclusion on political, economic, or social grounds, as well as slurs,
or “words that are inherently offensive and used as insulting labels.” 34
Tier two is broader still, encompassing pronouncements of a protected group’s physical
inferiority, such as generalizations regarding hygiene (i.e. dirty, filthy) or attractiveness (i.e.
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ugly, hideous); mental inferiority, such as generalizations regarding intellect (i.e. stupid, idiots),
education (i.e. illiterate, uneducated), or mental health (i.e. crazy, insane, retarded); moral
inferiority, such as generalizations regarding negative character traits (i.e. coward, liar), or sexual
habits (i.e. slut, pervert); group superiority (i.e. men are superior to women); group deviations
from a norm (i.e. freak, abnormal). Within the same tier also falls “self-admission to intolerance”
(i.e. homophobic, racist), expression of hatred (i.e. despise, hate), and assertion that a protected
group should be dismissed or not exist at all. Suggestions that a group causes sickness, repulsion,
or distaste (i.e. vile, disgusting, vomit) are also prohibited under this tier, as is cursing.
Acknowledging the social relativity of curse words, Facebook defines it as “Referring to the
target as genitalia or anus, including but not limited to: cunt, dick, asshole. Profane terms or
phrases with the intent to insult, including but not limited to: fuck, bitch, motherfucker. Terms or
phrases calling for engagement in sexual activity, or contact with genitalia, anus, feces or urine,
including but not limited to: suck my dick, kiss my ass, eat shit.” 35 Finally, the first tier forbids
speech that is violent or dehumanizing, especially generalizations about or comparisons to
insects, animals perceived as intellectually/physically inferior, filth, feces, bacteria, criminals,
sexual predators, and denials of existence. The Community Standards make special note of
“designated dehumanizing comparisons, generalizations, or behavioral statements,” referring to
stereotypes historically used to deride particular groups. These include blackface, comparisons of
Black people to apes, Jewish people manipulating governmental or financial institutions,
associations between Muslims and pigs, and women equated with property or objects. 36
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Content found to violate any of these three tiers faces removal by algorithmic or human
moderators. However, both man and machine have proven fallible, routinely taking down
acceptable material or missing instances of hate speech altogether. Yet the fundamental issue
with Facebook’s Community Standards lies not with their enforcement, but the very philosophy
that undergirds them. “Facebook adopts a post-racial, race-blind approach that does not consider
history and material differences, while its main focus is on enforcement, data, and efficiency.” 37
In doing so, argue Siapera and Viejo-Otera, the platform encourages users to develop their own
race-blind behaviors, socializing them into a system of regulation that essentializes racism as
“what Facebook defines as racist hate speech.” 38 Decontextualizing hate speech out of any
historical framework (re)produces white supremacy and commits substantial harm against
racialized minorities. Facebook’s commitment to free speech and “fundamental equality” creates
a calculus of absolute equivalence, treating a page or post that abuses others identically to the
page or post that defends others. Thus, a user who spouts racist rhetoric that does not impinge
upon the narrow Community Standards receives the exact same privileges and liberties as a user
who advocates for racial justice.
This position has faced pushback from within the company itself. According to leaked
audio files from an internal Facebook Q&A session, one person asked, “According to your
policies “men are trash” is considered tier-one hate speech. So what that means is that our
classifiers are able to automatically delete most of the posts or comments that have this phrase in
it. [Why?]” In response, Zuckerberg contended “We don’t think that [Facebook] should be in the
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business of assessing which group has been disadvantaged or oppressed.” 39 It follows, therefore,
that all races deserve equal protection on the platform…and it is one short step from ‘all races
matter’ to ‘All Lives Matter.’ “In these terms, Facebook applies a post-racial understanding of
race and racism, which is essentially a denial of the existing reality of racism.” 40 By attempting
to mitigate hate speech as a procedural issue, Facebook strips protected categories such as race
from all historical or sociopolitical context and in so doing erases past racisms, permits current
racisms, and encourages the proliferation of future ones.
The race-blind approach to content moderation not only reifies structures of white
supremacy, but actively inhibits racial justice. On her blog, anti-racist educator DiDi Delgado
relates her rocky relationship with Facebook and her repeated bans from the platform, an
experience shared by countless other Black activists. In an incisive article entitled “Mark
Zuckerberg Hates Black People,” Delgado explains that she has “lost count of how many Black
organizers have had their Facebook accounts temporarily or permanently banned for posting
content that even remotely challenges white supremacy.” 41 Many activists have received bans
simply for reposting screenshots of hate speech directed towards them. Often, the initial posts
themselves remained on the platform. Facebook banned another organizer for using the phrase
“Dear White People” in a post, and, in an instance of almost laughable irony, banned yet another
for their criticism of Facebook’s racist banning practices. 42 All of these situations reflect the fact
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that Facebook does not consider past or present oppression when designing its policies. In the
eyes of both machine and human content moderators, white people and Black people possess
identical histories, experiences, and privileges.
Sometimes, in fact, white people warrant additional privileges when it comes to hate
speech. As mentioned previously, Facebook’s classified censorship guidelines differentiate
between protected and unprotected subsets of the protected categories delineated in its definition
of hate speech. One post from a member of the US House of Representatives called for his
followers to identify, hunt, and kill radicalized Muslims. “Kill them all. For the sake of all that is
good and righteous. Kill them all.” 43 Despite this explicit call for violence, Facebook permitted
his post to remain on the platform because it specifically targeted radicalized Muslims: not a
protected subset. A ProPublica investigation into the company’s content moderation protocols
unearthed a particular training document used to familiarize reviewers with hate speech
procedures, including this principle of subcategorization. The slide asked viewers to determine
which of the following groups should receive protection from hate speech: female drivers, black
children, white men. Correct answer? White men. 44 Both race and gender fall under the
designation of protected categories, but neither drivers nor age do. Thus, female drivers and
black children—though victims of historical persecution and even violence—do not merit
protection from hate speech.
However, even this seemingly arbitrary demarcation of social groups as protected or
unprotected is subject to the whims of Facebook executives; the Community Standards that all
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users must consent to do not, it seems, apply to everyone equally. Political leaders, influential
public figures, and other social elites can operate with broader latitude as their speech is
considered important political discourse—even when it employs offensive or exclusionary
rhetoric. Posts from American president Donald Trump regarding his so-called Muslim ban
remained visible on the platform even when they clearly committed a third-tier violation of
“explicit exclusion, which means things like expelling certain groups or saying they are not
allowed.” 45 This particular case illustrates a much broader trend. Leaked documents from
Facebook “suggest that, at least in some instances, the company’s hate-speech rules tend to favor
elites and governments over grassroots activists and racial minorities.” 46 Prominent politicians
therefore possess tacit permission to disseminate prejudice, bigotry, and hatred on the platform.
Zuckerberg and Facebook spokespeople defend this practice by appealing to free speech and the
company’s mission to “bring the world closer together.” 47 Removal of harmful content is
discouraged in the name of connection and the global marketplace of ideas. As comedian, actor,
and activist Sacha Baron Cohen put it, “This is not about limiting anyone’s free speech. This is
about giving people, including some of the most reprehensible people on earth, the biggest
platform in history to reach a third of the planet.” 48 By adopting a race-blind approach that
indulges contemporary oppression while ignoring historic oppression, Facebook “merely repeats
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the same unfair treatment to which racialized people have been subjected.” 49 In spite of its
exhaustive Community Standards, hate speech continues to flourish on the platform.
VIRTUAL HATE, REAL VIOLENCE
Upon first glance, this issue appears to possess limited implications; hate speech, while
certainly undesirable, is only words, after all, and when posted on Facebook those words are not
even verbalized. When measured against the countless physical atrocities committed each day,
what harm can cyberhatred really cause? According to an ever-expanding body of literature, a
great deal. As even Facebook acknowledges, online instances of hate speech “are often linked
with offline violence.” 50 This phenomenon owes itself to the power of speech acts, as well as to a
variety of qualities peculiar to social media.
The generative capabilities of speech possess a rich and multidisciplinary scholarly
ancestry, drawing upon the work of J.L Austin, Jacques Derrida, and Judith Butler. Initially
introduced by Austin, speech act theory articulates the ability of “performative utterances” to not
merely describe existing realities, but to actively (re)produce them. He refers to this ability—the
power of words to do something rather than simply to say something—as “illocutionary force.” 51
While Austin sees the performativity of speech as dependent upon its utterance by the correct
subject in the correct circumstance to the correct audience, Derrida generalizes the theory,
connecting it instead to the iterability of speech. “Key for Derrida…is the iterability, or
repeatability, of the [speech]; it is this reiterative structure, the fact that the [speech] is the same
yet also differs and defers…that marks its force (and its power of signification) …. Because the
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[speech] must be repeated in order to signify, it is always both tied to and divorced from its
context of utterance. This separation…provides the performative’s force.” 52 Both iterability and
decontextualization—central to Derrida’s conceptualization of speech acts—is magnified on
social media platforms. Facebook allows a single post to circulate the globe in mere moments,
reaching millions of viewers who may lack the historical, social, or cultural background needed
to understand it or verify its veracity. In this way, speech acts on Facebook hold even greater
power to generate meaning and shape realities.
Judith Butler examines the ways in which individuals and collectivities can use that
power to oppress, harm, and violate others. In verbalizing racial slurs, the speaker “is thus citing
that slur, making linguistic community with a history of speakers” and therefore “accumulates
the force of authority through the repetition or citation of a…set of practices.” 53 Invoking the
historicity of a particular derogation reenacts social trauma and reifies subjugation. Observing
this same phenomenon, Nobel laureate Toni Morrison notes that “Oppressive languages does
more than represent violence; it is violence.” 54 Thus, hateful speech acts construct a subject,
imbue it with meaning, and then harm it by indexing a historical lineage of trauma. Facebook
allows language to overcome its usual spatial and temporal limits, circulating and iterating hate
speech—and the violence it creates—to an unprecedented degree.
This violence is compounded by social media’s ability to stimulate certain psychological
proclivities in ways that hijack critical reasoning capacities. Information-rich environments like
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the modern media ecosystem place attention at a premium, driving individuals to resort to
cognitive shortcuts such as heuristics when making decisions. Brown and Beruvides define
heuristics as “methods that use principles of effort-reduction and simplification that allow
decision makers to process information in a less effortful manner.” 55 Facebook users tend to
depend upon a series of these heuristics when assessing the reliability of the posts they view. In
particular, “accuracy is now equated with popularity.” 56 Because the platform’s algorithms
amplify sensationalized or negative content, heuristics-based reasoning indicates that hate speech
constitutes a legitimate, trustworthy source of information.
Facebook also tends to restrict the array of information sources that users access. In
order to increase engagement on the platform, Facebook’s personalization algorithms prioritize
displaying content similar to previously viewed content. If a user has displayed a preference for
cat videos, their feed will show them more cat videos, which makes the user view even more of
them and prompts the algorithm to double down on furry feline footage. Of course, this principle
applies to more nefarious content as well. Social media algorithms that create positive feedback
loops can facilitate radicalization, exposing users to incrementally more extreme viewpoints with
every post they share, video they view, or comment they like. This process simultaneously
restricts the range of content an individual can readily see. Müller and Schwarz observe that
“preferential selection may limit the spectrum of information people absorb and create ‘echo
chambers,’ which reinforce similar ideas.” 57 To return to our hypothetical cat-obsessed user,
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because they have demonstrated a clear preference for cat content, their online milieu will
consist of others who share their viewpoints. Some of those other users may not only love cats,
but think that cats are superior to dogs. Due to Facebook’s algorithm, more and more of this procat content will appear on our user’s feed, and the more of it they engage with, the more their
algorithm will yield similar yet marginally more extreme content. Before long, this user may not
only be pro-cat, but also rabidly anti-dog. They may begin to express sentiments of hatred
towards dogs, towards dog owners, or even towards any non-feline pet. Enabling this process of
radicalization, their personalized newsfeed will continue displaying content that aligns with the
user’s pre-existing opinions, further reinforcing them. This phenomenon is known as the ‘filter
bubble.’ Filter bubbles serve to “[isolate] people from a diversity of viewpoints and content,”
allowing them to exist within a subjective reality that fits comfortably within their personal
framework of biases and assumptions about the world. 58
The real danger arises when users then attempt to warp the real world to mirror that
subjective reality. Facebook hate speech, as it turns out, does not remain online; rather, it
engenders offline hatred, influences real actions, and causes physical violence. Research suggests
that “social media can act as a propagation mechanism for violent crimes” not only by providing
a platform for collective mobilization, but functioning as a channel for persuasion. 59 In one study
of the correlation between anti-refugee hate speech on Facebook and hate crimes targeting
refugees in Germany, vitriolic sentiment on the social media platform “persuades potential
perpetrators that refugees may be dangerous or undeserving, which may then push some people
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over the edge.” 60 Individuals who may not commit hate crimes in other circumstances find
themselves compelled to do so by the extremist rhetoric they are exposed to on Facebook. This
rhetoric receives amplification from the platform’s algorithms, designed to prey upon humans’
innate predisposition towards negative information in order to maximize user engagement. Hate
speech and its ilk are thus rendered lucrative real estate for digital advertisers, who line
Facebook’s pockets with billions of dollars in order to pitch their product to individuals
swamped by so much extraneous information that they can no longer devote their full cognitive
capabilities to processing it. The social media corporations, in short, profit off of hatred.
Facebook’s very business model facilitates the further marginalization of minority groups,
fosters inciteful rhetoric, and even enables genocide.
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CHAPTER TWO:
CONSEQUENCES OF RACIALIZED HATE SPEECH ON FACEBOOK
Hatred, of course, has existed both before and beyond Facebook. Social media does not
cause hate, but it can provide a platform for people to connect over their prejudice and fear,
allowing it to metastasize with unprecedented intensity and rapidity. Nowhere does this
phenomenon manifest more clearly than Myanmar, where the Rohingya ethnic minority have
faced what the UN called a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” 1 Though perpetrated offline,
the genocide was organized and encouraged on Facebook. Myanmar may represent the most
extreme example of social media exacerbating hate, but it is far from the only one. Facebook
possesses almost 3 billion monthly users across the world and its proclivity to aggravate social
tensions—particularly racial and ethnic ones—has raised concerns everywhere from India, to
France, to Ethiopia, to the United States. Clearly, it is far too late to put this genie back in the
bottle; Facebook is going nowhere. We must therefore ask some critical questions: what qualities
inherent to social media allow for such virulent hate speech? What other environmental factors
encourage this proliferation? How does online hate speech impact real-world conditions?
Understanding the nature of the hatred behind the Rohingya genocide can illuminate how
Facebook’s technological innovations amplify fundamental human tendencies, facilitating hate
speech that, if left unchecked, may burgeon into real-world violence.

1. “UN Human Rights Chief Points to ‘Textbook Example of Ethnic Cleansing’ in Myanmar.” UN News,
September 11, 2017, https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/564622-un-human-rights-chief-points-textbook-exampleethnic-cleansing-myanmar.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF MYANMAR
The region now known as Myanmar 2 possesses a rich history of Theravada Buddhism,
adopted from South India in the fourth century. Religious isolation from its geographic neighbors
led to expansionist policies that spanned multiple dynasties, and by the late 1500s the Burmese
Empire stretched across modern-day Laos and Thailand. Its later forays into China and Assam
caught the attention of Great Britain. A series of Anglo-Burmese wars played out through much
of the 19th century, culminating in British annexation in 1885. Eager to use the territory as a
stepping stone into China, Britain appended Myanmar as an Indian province. Substantial
resistance to colonization persisted, particularly in the northern region, and British administrators
resorted to burning and looting entire villages in order to suppress potential rebellion. They also
employed classic divide-and-conquer tactics; certain groups received favor and privileged
positions within the colonial regime, fomenting inter-ethnic conflict that prevented unified
opposition against the British. Renewed calls for independence gained momentum in the 1920s,
particularly on university campuses. One particularly charismatic law student, Aung San, worked
with the imperial Japanese to overthrow British rule. When Japan invaded Burma in 1942,
however, he switched allegiances, siding with Great Britain to drive out the Japanese instead.
Aung San eventually reached an agreement with Britain, and Burma emerged as a newly
independent state on January 4, 1948.
However, a 1962 coup deposed the democratically elected government, suspended the
constitution, and established a dictatorship under the Tatmadaw, the official name of the
Burmese military. The following decades witnessed intense economic hardship and suppression

2. The state’s official name changed in 1989 from the Union of Burma to the Union of Myanmar. The
United States government still refers to the country as Burma; however, this paper will follow the conventions of the
rest of the world and use Myanmar when referring to the country after 1989.
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of press freedom, prompting nation-wide demonstrations in the summer of 1988 that the military
violently dispersed. Over 3000 people were massacred, and thousands more fled the country.
These protests nevertheless planted seeds of resistance. Under the leadership of Aung San’s
daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi, various ethnic nationalist groups joined together in a new
democratic movement. 3 Facing immense pressure, the reigning dictator stepped down, and a new
military junta took power over the newly renamed Union of Myanmar. 4 Elections were held in
1990, yet despite an overwhelming victory for Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the Tatmadaw refused
to surrender power and Suu Kyi herself remained under house arrest. For her leadership and
dedication to non-violence in the struggle for democracy, she received the 1991 Nobel Peace
Prize. 5
Increased international scrutiny and a desire to attract foreign investment led to the
adoption of a new constitution in 2008, and the junta itself dissolved entirely in 2011. After a
transitional period, Aung San Suu Kyi ascended as the de facto leader of Myanmar, though the
2008 constitution prevents her from officially assuming the presidency. Free and fair elections in
2015 reaffirmed Burmese support for Suu Kyi, with her National League for Democracy party
winning in a landslide. However, the Tatmadaw continues to exercise enormous control over the
civilian government. One quarter of parliamentary seats are reserved for the military, giving it
veto power over any constitutional amendment. Myanmar’s 2020 elections firmly repudiated the
military’s proxy political party, and after its allegations of election fraud were disproven, the

3. Dinyar Godrej, “A Short History of Burma,” New Internationalist, April 18, 2008,
https://newint.org/features/2008/04/18/history.
4. Lindsay Maizland, “Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict,” Council
on Foreign Relations, February 10, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/myanmar-history-coup-military-ruleethnic-conflict-rohingya.
5. Godrej, “A Short History of Burma.”
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Tatmadaw staged another coup in February 2021. Aung San Suu Kyi and other elected officials
were detained, and Myanmar remains under martial law. 6
ETHNIC TENSIONS IN MYANMAR
Against this backdrop of colonization and military rule, ethnic conflict has permeated
Myanmar’s history. Immensely diverse, the state recognizes over 100 ethnic groups, with ethnic
Burmans constituting almost 70% of the population. Bamars, as they are known, have long
enjoyed privileged social and economic status as other minorities endure persistent
discrimination and disenfranchisement. 7 Members of the Rohingya ethnicity in particular face
extreme oppression; the UN Human Rights Council has referred to them as “the most persecuted
minority in the world.” 8 Inhabitants of the Arakan region—now the Rakhine state of northern
Myanmar—since the eighth century, they possess their own distinct language and practice Sunni
Islam. This sets them apart from the Hindu Bamars, who occupied Arakan in 1785. When Burma
came under British rule, colonial administrators sought to combat Bamar nationalist sentiments
by favoring Rohingya Muslims with bureaucratic positions. Favoritism policies like this
increased ethnic tensions during the Japanese invasion of World War II; while the Bamar sided
with Japan, Rohingya largely supported the British and even received military resources to help
combat Japanese imperialism. In light of this, upon gaining independence the Burmese
government refused citizenship to any Rohingya individual. 9

6. Maizland, “Myanmar’s Troubled History.”
7. Ibid.
8. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, “Human Rights Council Opens Special Session on
the Situation of Human Rights of the Rohingya and Other Minorities in Rakhine State in Myanmar,” December 5,
2017, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22491.
9. Rohingya Cultural Center, “History of the Rohingya,” accessed October 16, 2021,
https://rccchicago.org/history/.
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Their statelessness was further codified in the 1982 Citizenship Law passed by the
Tatmadaw, which identified 135 official Burmese ethnic groups but notably excluded the
Rohingya. According to the junta’s reasoning, any group not settled in Burma prior to
colonization immigrated under British imperial rule, and therefore illegally occupy land that
belongs to native Burmese. 10 This rhetoric indicates a broader appeal to Buddhist nationalist
sentiment. According to the Rohingya Cultural Center, “In the same vein as the early nationalist
movement under British occupation, [the Tatmadaw] fostered the belief that Burma is a land
purely for the Burmese Buddhists, and used the ‘us’ and ‘them’ discriminatory rhetoric to unite
the population under its military rule.” 11 Attempting to ‘purify’ Burma, the Tatmadaw launched
Operation Pyi Thaya, or “Clean and Beautiful Nation,” in 1991. Amidst a widespread campaign
of military violence, nearly one-quarter of a million Rohingya fled to Bangladesh, prompting the
establishment of a special border security unit that further harassed people either fleeing or
returning to the country. 12
Long-simmering tensions exploded in 2012 when ethnic riots erupted between Rohingya
Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists. Government-armed citizens murdered dozens of Rohingya and
burned their villages, displacing over 140,000 people. In response to the conflict, the Tatmadaw
imposed strict curfews and deployed military troops to Rakhine State, which only increased
distrust and hostility. Continued persecution drove many Rohingya to attempt perilous sea
journeys to Bangladesh, Thailand, and Malaysia. Countless refugees drowned or starved, and
those who arrived at their destinations often faced imprisonment or became victims of human
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Burma’s Path to Genocide,” accessed October 18, 2021,
https://exhibitions.ushmm.org/burmas-path-to-genocide/timeline.
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trafficking. 13 Even after the most acute violence abated, systematic cultural and political
exclusion persisted. The early 2010s saw a proliferation of Buddhist nationalist movements, as
well as organized attempts to further disenfranchise the Rohingya. A 2014 national census
excluded them entirely, and in 2015 the government began issuing special verification cards that
identified them as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. 14
The situation worsened in 2016. A small Rohingya militia assaulted a handful of police
stations in Rakhine State, resulting in nine casualties. In response, the Tatmadaw commenced
what they called a ‘clearance operation:’ systematic murder, rape, and looting. Over 86,000
Rohingya fled the country in what proved a harbinger of violence to come. 15 During August
2017, another Rohingya rebel group attacked several military outposts in Rakhine State and the
military retaliated with brutal force, terrorizing villages, killing over 10,000 people, and
displacing 740,000 more. The troops targeted men, women, and children indiscriminately, often
trapping them in their homes and setting the buildings alight, burning them inside before
disposing of their remains in mass graves. Those who fled faced rape, injury, and death. 16
Myanmar’s ‘clearance operations’ have culminated in the worst refugee crisis since the Rwandan
genocide, the creation of one of the world’s largest stateless populations, and, in the words of the
UN human rights chief, a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” 17

13. Rohingya Cultural Center, “History of the Rohingya.”
14. United States Holocaust Museum, “Burma’s Path to Genocide.”
15. Ibid.
16. United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Fact-finding Mission
on Myanmar, A/HRC/39/64, September 12, 2018, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFMMyanmar/A_HRC_39_64.pdf.
17. “The Rohingya Refugee Crisis is the Worst in Decades,” The Economist, September 21, 2017,
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2017/09/21/the-rohingya-refugee-crisis-is-the-worst-in-decades.
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DESIGNING A GENOCIDE
Such violent acts did not occur spontaneously. Rather, a United Nations report found,
“they were foreseeable and planned.” 18 Ethnic tension percolated for years in a sociopolitical
brew of legal discrimination and cultural persecution, but the Rohingya genocide was enabled,
perpetuated, and exacerbated on Facebook. Masquerading as fan pages of pop stars, national
heroes, and other celebrities, Myanmar military operatives launched a social media campaign to
dehumanize and denigrate the Rohingya minority. “The campaign…included hundreds of
military personnel who created troll accounts and news and celebrity pages on Facebook and
then flooded them with incendiary comments and posts timed for peak viewership.” 19 Reuters
completed an extensive investigation into hate speech posted by the Myanmar military. One such
post reads in Burmese, “Kill all the kalars [pejorative for Rohingya] that you see in Myanmar;
none of them should be left alive.” Another post from October 2016 proclaims that “If it’s kalar,
get rid of the whole race,” and an entire Facebook page devotes itself to the declaration, “We
will genocide all of the Muslims and feed them to the dogs.” 20 This sort of rhetoric actually
predates the ethnic cleansing campaign; in December 2013 one Facebook user implored their
viewers, “We must fight [the Rohingya] the way Hitler did the Jews, damn kalars!” Many posts
“call the Rohingya or other Muslims dogs, maggots and rapists, suggest they be fed to pigs, and
urge they be shot or exterminated. The material also includes crudely pornographic anti-Muslim

18. United Nations Human Rights Council, “Report.”
19. Paul Mozur, “A Genocide Incited on Facebook, With Posts From Myanmar’s Military,” The New York
Times, October 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html.
20. Steve Stecklow, “Why Facebook is Losing the War on Hate Speech in Myanmar,” Reuters, August 15,
2018. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate/.
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images.” 21
A propaganda campaign of this scope and complexity did not emerge overnight; the
Tatmadaw labored over its Facebook operations for years and devoted hundreds of personnel to
the effort. In 2017, sham accounts administered by the military began spreading rumors to their
respective Rohingya and Buddhist audiences about imminent attacks from the other side, sowing
fear and distrust while increasing popular support for the Tatmadaw itself. 22 The posts were
sensational, but seldom unbelievable. As one Burmese official trained in psychological warfare
put it, “If one quarter of the content is true, that helps make the rest of it believable.” Thus, the
military manipulated existing prejudices and anxieties in order to wreak violence with
unprecedented brutality and systematicity.
Anthropologist Alexander Hinton uses the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia to illustrate “the
importance of viewing genocide as a process…that is generated by a variety of factors and has
diverse outcomes.” 23 According to this framework, societies go through a period of ‘priming’—it
may be enduring or acute, low-grade or high-intensity—that makes genocide more or less likely.
In considering the Rohingya genocide, it is useful to examine the environmental primes taking
place in the physical world, as well as the psychological primes playing out on Facebook. Of
course, these macro- and micro-level factors did not operate separately; rather, they occurred in
tandem, (re)producing one another in a symbiosis inconceivable before the advent of social
media. Analyzing the interplay between them is crucial to understanding when, where, and how
hate speech on platforms like Facebook can influence or exacerbate violence on the ground.
21. Ibid.
22. Mozur, “A Genocide Incited on Facebook.”
23. Alexander Laban Hinton, Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide, (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 280.
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The actual violence carried out against the Rohingya could not have occurred without a
system of power that encouraged such harm. Philip Zimbardo, mastermind behind the infamous
Stanford Prison Experiment, emphasizes the importance of macro-level analysis when
understanding instances of hatred. In seeking to answer the question “How can good or ordinary
people do extraordinarily evil things?” Zimbardo argues that we must “recognize the extent and
limits of personal power, situational power, and systemic power.” 24 Thus, examining the
massacre of the Rohingya necessitates an analysis of the situational dynamics influencing
individual behavior, as well as the larger systemic forces that foment the situation itself.
Similarly, Chirot and McCauley name organization as one of the prerequisites for political mass
murder. “The actual perpetrators [of genocide] function more efficiently and can overcome their
moral reservations if they are well organized and led,” suggesting the need for an institution to
orchestrate and oversee large-scale massacres. 25
For Myanmar, that institution is the military. With a standing force of over half a million,
the Tatmadaw wields immense political, physical, and cultural force within the country. “From
the moment they enter boot camp, Tatmadaw troops are taught that they are guardians of a
country — and a religion — that will crumble without them.” 26 This existential responsibility
serves as a rationalization for extreme action. Zimbardo identifies this phenomenon, which he
terms a ‘justifying ideology’ as a key tool in ‘System Power’s’ institutional authorization of
violence. “Ideology,” he explains, “is a slogan or proposition that usually legitimizes whatever

24. Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil, (New York: Random
House, 2007), x.
25. Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley, Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass
Political Murder, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 57.
26. Hannah Beech, “Inside Myanmar’s Army: ‘They See Protesters as Criminals.,” The New York Times,
March 28, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/28/world/asia/myanmar-army-protests.html.
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means are necessary to attain an ultimate goal…. Those in authority present the program as good
and virtuous, as a highly valuable moral imperative.” 27 The Tatmadaw constructed the Rohingya
as an ‘Other’ that not only existed outside of Burmese Buddhism, but actively threatened its
integrity. By elevating its members as defenders of their nation and faith, the military created a
system that both permitted and rewarded the elimination of that ‘threat.’ Its particular brand of
Buddhist nationalism goes far beyond simply justifying atrocities committed against the
Rohingya; it validates them as necessary and even heroic.
Power hierarchies cultivated and enforced by military culture also create the necessary
permission structure for mass murder. Both Chirot and McCauley and Zimbardo examine the
role that obedience to authority plays in individuals’ willingness to carry out violence against
another human being. This can stem from the diffusion of responsibility as well as the fear of
punishment that comes with power stratification. The former dynamic came to the forefront of
the world’s collective conscience after the Holocaust when scholars, political leaders, and
laypeople alike began asking who deserves more blame: the Nazi soldier who killed an innocent
Jewish person, or the Nazi leader who did not directly take a single life but ordered the deaths of
thousands? An individual in the Tatmadaw would likely find it easier to commit otherwise
unthinkable atrocities when directed by a superior to do so because the moral—and potentially
legal—liability then falls upon the commanding officer. As Alexander Hinton notes in his
analysis of the Cambodian genocide, “For most people, killing is easier when it is authorized by
another person or institution.” 28 Cultures that encourage the blind following of orders can
therefore allow for large-scale perpetration of violence.

27. Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect, 226.
28. Hinton, Why Did They Kill? 279.
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In addition to the suspension of moral reservations, organizers of political mass murder
such as the Rohingya genocide often employ fear and coercion to impel violence. This can take
the form of individual threats, as well as ontological ones. Zimbardo notes that high exit costs
can make ordinary people more likely to commit violence by intensifying the risks of
disobedience. 29 Sure enough, an anonymous Tatmadaw military doctor confessed, “I want to
quit, but I can’t. If I do, they will send me to prison. If I run away, they will torture my family
members.” 30 Credible possibility of punishment can compel individuals to harm innocents even
if they possess moral misgivings.
However, organizations that do not directly intimidate their members may still invoke
threat as an impetus to violence. “Fear,” conclude Chirot and McCauley, “is perhaps the key
emotion for understanding genocide.” 31 The justifying ideologies employed by System Power
often fabricate an enemy, then appeal to fear of that enemy in order to encourage particular
actions. National security, Zimbardo points out, is often marshalled as a justification for going to
war even when no real threat exists. 32 This framework allows individuals to rationalize violence
as acts of self-defense. Indeed, “the most powerful fear is fear of extinction, the fear that ‘our’
people, ‘our’ cause, ‘our’ culture, ‘our’ history may not survive. This fear will elicit the most
violent and extreme reactions.” 33 Members of the Tatmadaw imbibe a steady stream of Buddhist

29. Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect, 274.
30. Beech, “Inside Myanmar’s Army.”
31. Chirot and McCauley, Why Not Kill Them All? 61.
32. Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect, 274.
33. Chirot and McCauley, Why Not Kill Them All? 62.
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nationalist propaganda that construe the Rohingya’s very existence as a threat to their own. 34
Thus, murdering Rohingya men, raping Rohingya women, or burning Rohingya villages does not
constitute a gross violation of innocent life, but a laudable defense of one’s home and religion.
Though these ethnic tensions have existed in Myanmar for decades, if not centuries, they
are increasingly aggravated by a larger trend towards retribalization. Humans’ innate tendency to
self-identify with a collective and equate their safety and wellbeing with one’s own can instill a
sense of belonging and camaraderie, but also enables inter-group conflict. 35 Erich Fromm names
this phenomenon ‘group narcissism,’ and observes that it comprises “one of the most important
sources of human aggression.” 36 Perceived threats to the group simultaneously constitute threats
to oneself. In Myanmar, where existence has been rendered a zero-sum game and cohabitation an
impossibility, heterogeneity—the very presence of diverse peoples and customs—represents just
such a threat. “Any group within the state’s borders that does not accept its legitimacy on
cultural grounds threatens its very integrity, the life of the state, and of the nation represented by
that state. Even if a non-state cultural group wants to be loyal to the state it inhabits, suspicion
that it is untrustworthy threatens the state and opens that group up to persecution.” 37 This cycle
of difference, distrust, and oppression has long characterized the Rohingya’s status in Myanmar.
De facto and de jure inequality between groups only increases the risk of conflict between them.
Explaining the conditions that give rise to sadistic behaviors, Fromm emphasizes that “the power
through which one group exploits and keeps down another tends to generate sadism in the

34. Beech, “Inside Myanmar’s Military.”
35. Chirot and McCauley, Why Not Kill Them All? 62.
36. Erich Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (Greenwich: Fawcett Press, 1973), 231.
37. Chirot and McCauley, Why Not Kill Them All? 49.
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controlling group.” 38 Thus, Myanmar’s extreme polarization leads to toxic group identification
in which the endurance of the Bamar group is seen to depend on the Rohingya’s elimination.
Violence produced by this sort of retribalization is exacerbated by social stratification, which
normalizes the ethnic majority’s control, dominance, and exploitation of the minority.
In conceptualizing genocide as a dynamic and variable process, Hinton adopts a
metaphor of heat to assess the relative likelihood of political mass murder. A ‘cool’ situation
may not possess many or particularly extreme genocidal primes, while a ‘hot’ situation will
feature a multitude of them. 39 Though the particular constellation of primes differs from situation
to situation, he identifies political upheaval, structural divisions, identifiable target groups, and
discriminatory political changes as common precursors to genocide. After the dissolution of the
military regime in 2011, Myanmar underwent rapid sociopolitical transformation: free elections
were held, Aung San Suu Kyi stepped up as the head of the civilian government, and
independent media proliferated. Though much of the ‘Western’ world lauded these steps towards
liberalization, they may have detrimentally impacted stability within the state. Retrospective
analysis of Suu Kyi’s rhetoric reveals long-standing anti-Islamic sentiments and a strong
Buddhist nationalist bent. Despite her Nobel Peace Prize, she has never vocally intervened in the
military’s persecution of the Rohingya. Indeed, she expressed on record to the International
Court of Justice her belief “that Rohingya is not an identity that should be recognized.” 40 Aung
San Suu Kyi’s leadership may have actually lent legitimacy to her country’s ethnic cleansing
campaigns by casting it in the warm glow of democratization. However, research suggests that
38. Fromm, The Anatomy, 331.
39. Hinton, Why Did They Kill? 280.
40. Azeem Ibrahim, “Myanmar Has Blazed a Path to Democracy Without Rights,” Foreign Policy, January
16, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/16/myanmar-democracy-rohingya/.
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“democratization has amplified polarization in the country, especially among different Buddhist
groups, the government, and various ethnic groups, causing numerous factions to fend for their
interests and leaving the Rohingya without a political ally.” 41 The rapid expansion of political
liberties has created space for the proliferation of Buddhist nationalist extremism. Though it may
seem counterintuitive, sociopolitical transformation—even ostensibly ‘good’ transformation such
as the expansion of democracy—often presages genocide. “Such events,” writes Hinton, “upset
the status quo, destabilize previous understandings and people’s sense of well-being…intensify
group division, force people to take sides, undermine social structures that promote cohesion and
solidarity, and create a sense of threat and danger.” 42 Anti-Rohingya sentiment certainly existed
prior to Myanmar’s governmental transition. The uncertainty, instability, and power vacuums
that accompany political turmoil, however, exacerbated those tensions.
Codification of ethnic inequality under the Tatmadaw constitutes a genocidal prime as
well. Myanmar possesses significant ethnolinguistic diversity, as well as a protracted history of
ethnolinguistic hierarchization. “While all societies have a degree of pluralism, structural
divisions crystallize more readily in situations in which the cleavages between groups cut across
a number of domains, involve domination, exploitation, and inequality, are linked to a history of
tension and conflict, or are reflected by political polarizations.” 43 All of these dynamics are at
play in Myanmar. Decades-long disenfranchisement campaigns gave legal clout to sociocultural
distinctions between the Bamars and the Rohingya. Geographically isolated, religiously separate,

41. Jennifer Whitten-Woodring et al., “Poison If You Don’t Know How to Use It: Facebook, Democracy,
and Human Rights in Myanmar,” The International Journal of Press/Politics 25, no. 3 (July 2020): 407–25.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161220919666.
42. Hinton, Why Did They Kill? 282.
43. Ibid, 284.
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linguistically unique, denied citizenship, and forced to bear special identification cards, the
Rohingya were constructed as a stigmatized and identifiable group ripe for targeting.
GENOCIDAL PRIMES IN CYBERSPACE
The domestic institutional, social, and political factors discussed above created a ‘hot’
situation within Myanmar, but by themselves were not sufficient to propel the country to
genocide. As Hinton discusses, genocide constitutes a “bricolage” of macrosocial, local, and
personal elements. Ethnic cleansing operations like that of the Tatmadaw therefore involve not
only particular environmental conditions, but also individual constructions of significance. 44
Much of the psychosocial meaning-making that fueled the Rohingya genocide took place on
Facebook. An independent UN fact-finding mission into the situation in Myanmar found that
“The role of social media [in the genocide] is significant. Facebook has been a useful instrument
for those seeking to spread hate, in a context where, for most users, Facebook is the Internet.
Although improved in recent months, the response of Facebook has been slow and ineffective.” 45
The social media platform’s reach and ubiquity made it the ideal means through which the
Tatmadaw could spread inflammatory propaganda. Justifying ideologies constructed by the
System Power in order to validate, necessitate, and reward extreme violence are propagated on
Facebook, circulating with a speed and reach unmatched by any other form of media.
Technological amplification of standard propagandic strategies therefore facilitated the spread of
Buddhist nationalist pride, linked closely to anti-Rohingya rhetoric.
This unique cyberscape metastasizes prejudice and bigotry into a virulent hatred. In his
psychological analysis of hatred, Willard Gaylin defines prejudice as “when the negative
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attributes ascribed to a person by virtue of his or her being a member of a disdained or despised
group are highlighted.” 46 Essentializing an out-group—distilling an entire collective down to
qualities possessed by a few individuals—enables moral disengagement that allows suffering and
even justifies abuse. Anti-Rohingya Facebook posts display exactly this sort of prejudice. Many
of them refer to all Muslims with terms of sexual deviance or transgression; the essentialization
of the entire ethnic group as ‘rapists’ is particularly prominent. Drawing on Myanmar’s history
of colonization and British favoritism, Facebook posts frequently disparage the Rohingya as
dangerous traitors as well.
Closely tied to prejudice disfavoring an out-group is bigotry favoring the in-group.
Gaylin identifies this as a second precursor to hatred, one characterized by an intense
“[partiality] to one’s own group, religion, race, or politics and [intolerance] of those who
differ.” 47 In the case of Myanmar, this most frequently manifests in a strong sense of Buddhist
nationalism. “On Facebook and offline, ultranationalists have framed Muslims as posing both a
personal threat and a threat to the Buddhist majority nation. They have made claims about high
Muslim birthrates, increasing Muslim economic influence, and Muslim plans to take over the
country.” 48 Though these claims do not reflect demographic realities, they nevertheless foster a
stratified subjectivity in which ‘superior’ Buddhist Bamars face constant danger of
impurification or even extinction from ‘inferior’ Muslim Rohingyas. Civilian government
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officials have not vocally opposed this conceptualization for fear of alienating an influential
voting bloc. The Tatmadaw, meanwhile, actively encourages ultranationalism because “military
leadership benefits from Buddhist perceptions that it is defending the Buddhist-majority
nation.” 49 Vilification of the Rohingya as an existential threat to both Buddhism and Myanmar
further entrenches the military. When substantial portions of the population view the Tatmadaw
as critical to the defense of faith and country, they tend to turn a blind eye to its power abuses.
The military, therefore, possesses a vested interest in stoking prejudice and bigotry.
Though hatred cannot be reduced to prejudice and bigotry, they are, as Gaylin writes,
important “waystations” on the road to it. The transition to hate requires “a feeling of being
threatened or humiliated,” fueling fear and rage. 50 Facebook has provided the optimal platform
for this transition. As part of its propaganda campaign, the Tatmadaw would post
decontextualized images of dead bodies, then claimed they were the victims of Muslimperpetrated massacres. Sham accounts also spread simultaneous rumors that Muslim groups were
planning terrorist attacks on Buddhist communities, and vice versa. 51 This fear-mongering
invoked widespread feelings of vulnerability and uncertainty. When anxiety and anger become
linked to a particular person or group, hatred arises. Hatred in this sense does not refer merely to
a strong negative emotion, but to a complex sentiment that requires an obsessive attachment to a
subject. Gaylin defines it as “a sustained emotion of rage that occupies an individual through
much of his life, allowing him to feel delight in observing or inflicting suffering on the hated
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one. [Hatred] is always obsessive and almost always irrational.” 52 The emphasis on longevity
and relationality sets hatred apart from its more ephemeral and isolated cousin, anger.
Nevertheless, anger plays a significant role in the fomentation of hate, which Gaylin sees as
arising out of fear and rage directed towards a self-created enemy. Hate speech posted on
Facebook—by both military and civilian accounts—effectively constructs the Rohingya as a
target for those emotions.
Chirot and McCauley identify hatred as derivative of not only anger and anxiety, but also
contempt and disgust. Targeted groups are often essentialized as dirty or profane, thereby
endangering the ‘purity’ of the in-group and instilling a deep-seated fear that persists
independent of any tangible threat. It is not a fear of physical harm, but of pollution. Fear of
pollution involves the belief that an ‘Other’ is inherently dirty, disgusting, foul, and/or profane
not by virtue of what they do, but simply because of who they are. Throughout history, countless
instances of ethnic cleansing have stemmed from just such a fear; the forcible removal of a
people “[mirrors] the same wish to cleanse the land of infidel pollution and danger.” 53 The same
principle appears at play in the Myanmar genocide. One emblematic Facebook posts reads,
“These non-human kalar dogs, the Bengalis [Rohingya], are killing and destroying our land, our
water and our ethnic people. We need to destroy their race.” 54 This rhetoric explicitly links the
existence of the Rohingya to the degradation of physical territory and cultural integrity. In this
way, they are constructed as what Gaylin terms a ‘territorial enemy.’ 55 Ideological differences
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between Buddhism and Islam do not necessarily underpin the hatred Bamars feel towards
Rohingya; rather, a proximal group is targeted, and land used as a validation for hatred by
fabricating the threat of an unjust deprivation of resources. The Rohingya have long constituted a
territorial scapegoat, their very presence in the region ahistoricized and maligned as illegal. This
rationalization also perpetuates the idea of Myanmar as a (Buddhist) ‘homeland’ that requires
protection from outsiders. Thus, territory becomes a symbol that transcends its actual, physical
importance. Preserving Myanmar and the Bamar ethnicity, in this formulation, therefore requires
the elimination of the Rohingya entirely; the mere existence of the latter precludes that of the
former.
Repeated invocations of Muslim men raping Buddhist women also conjure fears of
pollution. In this case, the pollution is transferred from one party to another through sexual
contact, symbolizing the implantation of contamination into the broader collective. The
‘threatened’ ethnic group is literally impregnated with impurity. Similarly, many inflammatory
Facebook posts liken Rohingya to cockroaches, dogs, or pigs—animals commonly associated
with filth and disease. 56 Such comparisons serve a dual purpose: they dehumanize the Rohingya,
suspending the moral reservations that usually accompany inflicting harm upon another human,
while also reinforcing the essentialization of the ethnic group as dirty and polluting.57 Repeatedly
associating the Rohingya with repulsiveness “justifies the violence against them because their
disgusting characteristics threaten to pollute the environment and must be eliminated.” 58 AntiRohingya hate speech on Facebook generates and feeds into fears that they will contaminate the
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Bamar ‘essence,’ thus rendering ethnic cleansing both permissible and obligatory as a form of
group self-defense.
FACEBOOK AS A TOOL FOR HATE
However, Facebook is not merely a benign platform unwittingly hosting hateful
language, or even a neutral tool harnessed for malevolent purposes. In fact, several of its defining
characteristics exacerbate psychological tendencies recognized as key factors in the perpetration
of genocide. The wealth of information available in modern media environments can drive
individuals to take cognitive shortcuts due to an inability to allocate sufficient attention to all
relevant inputs. Social media users may therefore resort to heuristics to simplify informationprocessing and expedite decision making. Though not inherently negative, such strategies can
create and reinforce prejudices. Heuristic-based cognition in social media environments
“encourages fringe-thinking through the confirmation of pre-existing biases.” 59 Confronted with
billions of data points jostling for finite attention, Facebook users often take mental shortcuts that
can produce sweeping conclusions from minimal informational input. This leads to the
perpetuation of stereotypes and prejudicial views of particular groups. Through this process,
users “see millions of diverse individuals as a single object.” 60 Universalizing judgements and
character traits are assigned without care for nuance or even accuracy; all women are emotional,
all Muslims are terrorists, all Rohingya are evil. An entire race, gender, nationality, or ethnicity
is boiled down to a single perceived essence, categorized as entirely good or entirely bad. Such
essentializing logic determines an individual’s ontological guilt based not upon what they have
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or have not done, but merely upon what group they belong to.
Often, essentialization occurs in tandem with the separate but parallel psychological
process of dehumanization. “The misperception of certain others as subhuman, bad humans,
inhuman, infrahuman, dispensable, or ‘animals’ is facilitated by means of labels, stereotypes,
slogans, and propaganda images.” 61 Facebook posts repeatedly referred to the Rohingya as
‘kalars,’ a derogatory, racialized slur used to highlight perceived phenotypical and ethnic
differences between them and Bamars. This linguistic decision already establishes the Rohingya
as an inferior ‘other.’ However, the dehumanization is further exacerbated by frequent
essentializations of Rohingya as rapists, illegal immigrants, terrorists, and even animals such as
pigs and dogs. 62 Hate speech like this is reminiscent of propaganda techniques during the
Rwandan genocide, the perpetrators of which often called Tutsis ‘cockroaches.’ Indeed,
dehumanization and essentialization have been repeatedly identified as key parts of the genocidal
process.
Each person is assessed not on the basis of his or her individual characteristics, but in
terms of his or her membership in an abstract category that is essentialized, stigmatized,
and targeted for elimination…. This ideological marking…further sets ‘them’ apart from
the larger social community through devaluation. As less than fully human beings, these
‘others’ are depicted as legitimate targets of violence whose execution should not pose a
moral dilemma. 63
Deriding all Rohingya as terrorists or dogs crystallizes normally fluid and even minor differences
between them and the Bamars, castigating them as an irreconcilable ‘Other’ fundamentally
opposed to the ethnic majority.
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Subjugating them to an infrahuman status creates a permission structure for normally
unthinkable atrocities. It does not matter that one would never commit such acts upon another
human being, because the Rohingya are not seen as human at all. The moral architecture that
governs interactions between people no longer apply. To use Martin Buber’s framework,
relationships have devolved from ‘I-Thou’ to ‘I-It.’ 64 This fosters moral disengagement,
allowing individuals to perpetrate extreme violence without causing an internal ethical crisis.
Unburdened by self-censure, rape, murder, and massacre suddenly become reasonable courses of
action. Suspending the humanity of an entire group of people can therefore heat up a situation
already primed for genocide.
Though essentialization and dehumanization may constitute common hallmarks of
genocide, these cognitive processes usually permeate society slowly and organically. With the
introduction of communications technology, this can happen far more swiftly. Radio programs,
for example, were effectively used during the Rwandan genocide to popularize dehumanizing
rhetoric. 65 But while a radio program may reach a few thousand people who happen to tune in at
a particular moment within a particular geographic area, a social media post persists and
propagates without regard to space or time. Individuals in Myanmar could receive near-constant
exposure to anti-Rohingya hate speech online, (re)creating dehumanizing prejudices over and
over again.
Deindividuation fosters moral disengagement as well. In his analysis of the Stanford
Prison Experiment, Zimbardo observes the pivotal role that physical disguises such as uniforms
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or masks play in creating abusive environments. Such “disguises of one’s usual
appearance…promote anonymity and reduce personal accountability. When people feel
anonymous in a situation, as if no one is aware of their true identity…they can be more easily
induced to behave in antisocial ways.” 66 Secure in the knowledge that identification of individual
perpetrators is unlikely, deindividuated people may feel more comfortable committing acts of
violence. Social media amplifies deindividuation to a degree seldom found in the physical world.
Under cover of a screen name, with personal information limited or even fabricated, individuals
recognize their own anonymity as one user in a community of billions. This generates a
pervasive sense of impunity. Individuals will post or share opinions on Facebook that they may
never express in real life, operating within a “general norm of permissiveness…that created a
sense that [they] could do pretty much whatever they felt like doing because they were not
personally accountable and could get away with anything because no one was watching.” 67
Deindividuation on social media can therefore serve as a license for extremism and hate speech.
Facebook played a critical role in the moral disengagement of an entire nation as it offered a high
degree of anonymity that encouraged essentializing and dehumanizing rhetoric about the
Rohingya, contributing to the activation of existing genocidal primes.
In fact, Facebook may have facilitated not only the spread of hate speech, but the
collectivization of hatred itself. Gaylin identifies two related yet distinct groups bound by hate:
communities of haters and cultures of hatred. “The community of haters,” he writes, “is a group
of disparate individuals who find one another and band together because of their shared
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passion.” 68 Facebook facilitates the development of such communities, creating a forum for
people to bond over their common hatred and encouraging a process of identification in which
individuals merge their own identities with that of the group as a whole. Technology makes this
process easier than ever. Social media in particular allows for the transcendence of time and
space, factors that may once have delimited when and where communities of haters could arise
and what impact they could have. In allowing for the proliferation of anti-Rohingya sentiment,
Facebook spawned an online community for individuals to share and (re)produce hate.
However, the social media platform seems to have expanded this phenomenon beyond an
ad hoc group of virtual haters; it may have aided in the transformation of Myanmar into a culture
of hatred. While a community of haters is artificially founded by its members based on their
shared passion, a culture of hatred refers to “a natural community that breeds and encourages
hatred.” 69 Such cultures often possess a collective history and shared land, and leaders
indoctrinate members into hatred towards a designated enemy. With its entrenched military,
powerful Buddhist nationalist influence, and historic oppression of minority ethnic groups,
Myanmar certainly seems to fit this description. Gaylin notes that when quotidian biases intersect
with religious or nationalist credos, those biases can intensify and fixate on a particular
scapegoated group. 70 This shared ideology and agreed-upon enemy can collectivize individual
prejudice into communal hatred. Social media enables this process to occur on a vast scale and
with a hitherto unimaginable speed, immune to the geographic and temporal limitations that bind
other modes of communication. Though Myanmar already possessed the making of a culture of
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hatred, its deterioration was hastened by online hate speech. In short, Facebook did not cause the
ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya, but it did enable the organizational, psychological, social, and
cultural prerequisites of genocide.
FACEBOOK HATRED BEYOND MYANMAR
Worse, internal Facebook documents suggest that history is repeating itself. Unrest in
Ethiopia between the government and residents of the northern Tigray region has escalated into
civil war, with mass displacement, murder, and sexual violence. As in Myanmar, hate speech on
social media has only aggravated the situation. “Facebook said it had observed a cluster of
accounts affiliated with the [government-backed] militia group… using its platform to ‘seed calls
for violence,’ promote armed conflict, recruit and fundraise.” 71 Despite pledges of reform after
the Rohingya genocide, the company has clearly failed to invest sufficient resources and money
into protecting vulnerable minorities.
Halting the cycle of cyberhate and violence requires a close examination of the tragedies
that have already unfolded, and what enabled them. In Myanmar, a unique array of sociopolitical
factors already primed the country for genocide: the organizing institution of the military, a
hierarchy permissive of atrocity, retribalization of ethnic identity, political unrest, rapid media
liberalization, codification of difference and inequality. However, the mere presence of these
conditions does not guarantee genocide as an inevitability. Facebook played a crucial role in
perpetuating the psychological and ideological frameworks that transitioned Myanmar from
political unrest to political mass murder. Posts on the platform played into existing prejudices,
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rendering the Rohingya not simply a disenfranchised minority but the object of an obsessive and
destructive hatred. This sentiment is intensified through rhetoric that constructs them as a
corrosive danger to Buddhism and Myanmar itself. Confronted with this existential threat, the
Bamar ethnic majority must exterminate the Rohingya in order to protect their own self-identity.
Fears of pollution are reinforced by Facebook posts that dehumanize Rohingya individuals. By
engaging in virtual essentializing discourse, individuals cultivate a moral disengagement that
renders violence easier to rationalize, atrocities easier to commit, and the unthinkable easier to
do. Though these cognitive processes exist in almost every instance of genocide, social media
exacerbates them. The deindividuation that comes with an online avatar lessens users’ sense of
impunity, and Facebook’s ability to transcend time and space enables the proliferation of moral
disengagement and justifying ideologies on a hitherto unfathomable scale.
Patterns from Myanmar have emerged in Ethiopia, India, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka,
and even the United States. 72 Hate speech on Facebook amplifies tension, unrest, and prejudices
that may otherwise not have precipitated genocide, serving as a trigger or activation switch for
mass violence. If the global community hopes to prevent the Rohingya genocide from repeating
itself in Tigray, in Kashmir, and in countless other places across the world, it must place pressure
on Facebook to resource its market expansions and implement structural algorithmic reform.
According to whistleblower Frances Haugen, “The raw version [of Facebook] roaming wild in
most of the world doesn't have any of the things that make it kind of palatable in the United
States, and I genuinely think there's a lot of lives on the line—that Myanmar and Ethiopia are
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like the opening chapter.” 73 If that is true, then the world cannot afford for the rest of the book to
be written.
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CHAPTER THREE:
SOLUTIONS TO RACIALIZED HATE SPEECH ON FACEBOOK
Facebook’s exacerbation of hate speech simultaneously represents a moral dilemma, a
policy puzzle, as well as a business conundrum. Each of these aspects are inextricably
intertwined. However, current efforts ranging from corporate responsibility to global governance
fail to grapple with the often-contradictory interests of the company, the sovereign state, and the
world at large. Examining the strengths and shortcomings of ongoing initiatives at each of these
scales can illuminate the steps that must be taken to mitigate the harm of Facebook. No existing
measure alone is adequate, nor will an adequate measure be easy. The issue of hate speech on
Facebook falls at the fuzzy nexus of united regulation and unimpeded sovereignty, private free
speech and public censorship. To safeguard one principle, one often must suppress its corollary.
Corporations, nations, and the international community must therefore consider the sacrifices
they are willing to make: is Facebook’s vision of connecting the globe worth the cost of safety
and wellbeing? Thwarting the recurrence of social media-fueled genocide will require
unprecedented and innovative action coordinated from the United Nations to Menlo Park.
THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRISIS OF JURISDICTION
Since its conception, the United Nations has dedicated itself to the advancement of lofty,
arguably unattainable ideals. Its founding charter outlines the organization’s purpose in a series
of starry-eyed articles: “to take collective effective measures for the…removal of threats to the
peace;” “to strengthen universal peace;” to “[promote and encourage] respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedoms for all;” and to “[harmonize] the actions of nations.” 1 Two
hundred states have agreed to these ambitions in theory, at least. However, the realization of
1. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/uncharter/full-text, art. 1.1-1.4.
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universal peace and harmony has proven elusive, regularly running up against the harsh and
contradictory conditions of reality: differential power, prejudice and racisms, human greed,
governmental and corporate corruption. In fact, shortly after the delineation of the UN’s
admirable aims, the body’s charter includes a clause acquiescing to the preeminence of national
vice over global virtue: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state.” 2 Article 2.7 may constitute the most consequential sentence of the entire UN charter. It
forbids intervention into domestic affairs, yet fails to specify exactly what falls under that
category, empowering Member States to cry ‘sovereignty’ whenever they disagree with a UN
edict. Although independence is an important and arguably inherent right of any state, the typical
interpretation of Article 2.7 cripples any collective effort to actually achieve any of the
objectives laid out in the first article. The United Nations archives overflow with documents that
report findings or request action on pressing global issues but lack any enforcement power. For
fear of violating state sovereignty, the UN must recommend, not require.
This stalemate between efficacy, authority, and mandate on the one hand and impotence,
sovereignty, and entreaty on the other characterizes international efforts to address hate speech
on social media. Fernand de Varennes, the UN special rapporteur on minority issues, has called
digital hate speech “one of today’s most acute challenges to human dignity and life.” 3 He has
advocated for Facebook to give greater consideration towards marginalized groups when
assessing controversial content, and for the unification of corporate and international hate speech
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standards. Despite the rapporteur’s astute and timely advice, the United Nations cannot impose
legally obligatory directives to that end. Jurisdiction—already a perilous quagmire for the UN—
grows even trickier when it concerns private enterprises like corporations. Because it is not a
signatory of the UN charter, Facebook need not abide by UN treaties or mandates. The United
Nations has nevertheless worked within its narrow sphere of influence to formulate policy
addressing online hate speech from multiple angles. Lack teeth they might, but the UN’s efforts
to promote corporate social responsibility and protect the freedom of expression can serve as
inspiration for more substantive action.
Upon first glance, it appears that the United Nations already possesses the requisite
documents to justify the regulation of hate speech on Facebook and other social media platforms.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights—one of the premier components of the
international law pantheon—unequivocally establishes the right to “life, liberty, and security of
person.” 4 Online rhetoric that incites violence and even genocide demonstrably violates this
fundamental right. However, while documents such as this purportedly occupy a space of
universality, the realm in which they hold the force of law remains far more restricted. Only 48
UN member states signed on to it, and as a mere ‘declaration’ it did not initially impose legal
obligations. Most scholars concur that it has since achieved the status of customary international
law, which does grant it binding authority. 5 Further, many of the rights within the Universal
Declaration have been expanded and codified in subsequent treaties such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and

4. United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948, 217 A (III),
https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights, art. 3.
5. Hurst Hannum, “The UDHR in National and International Law,” Health and Human Rights 3, no. 2
(1998): 144–58, https://doi.org/10.2307/4065305.
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Cultural Rights. These act with the force of law upon every nation in the world, preventing
government action that would violate the terms of such covenants and imposing certain
obligations upon states to protect the rights therein. Yet these duties and constraints apply only to
sovereign states; corporations—such as Facebook—need not abide by them.
In fact, the status of private entities under international law has long remained murky.
Though they have legal personhood under United States law as of the Citizens United vs. FEC
decision in 2010, international courts do not “specifically distinguish between natural persons
and juridical persons.” 6 Such ambiguity renders the assignation of liability difficult in instances
such as the Myanmar genocide, when corporations contribute to genocide or crimes against
humanity without actually perpetrating them. More recent documents such as the UN’s Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights may elucidate the subject.
Published in 2011, it begins by calling for the implementation of its subsequent
recommendations with regard to the vulnerability and systemic marginalization of particular
groups. Against this backdrop, the Guiding Principles establish the responsibility of states to
protect against human rights abuses within their jurisdiction, including by third parties like
business enterprises. Individual states and the international community must therefore devise
legal frameworks to ensure that businesses respect human rights. The businesses themselves,
however, do not bear the same responsibilities as states. Corporations should respect—though
they need not proactively protect—human rights and avoid infringing upon them, addressing
violations should they arise. These obligations exist “over and above compliance with national
laws and regulations,” indicating the responsibility of businesses to respect human rights

6. José E. Alvarez, “Are Corporations ‘Subjects’ of International Law?” Santa Clara Journal of
International Law 9, no. 1 (2011): 1—36, https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil/vol9/iss1/1/, 9.
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transcends the responsibility of states to protect them. 7 Therefore, even if an individual nation
violates the rights of its citizens, companies doing business within that nation do not receive a
free pass to do the same. In instances of state-sanctioned infringement, “the responsibility to
respect human rights requires that business enterprises…seek to prevent or mitigate adverse
human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services by their
business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts.” 8 By such logic,
Facebook bears clear responsibility for preventing and mitigating the impact of hate speech on its
site. This rebuts the company’s claim that it merely serves as a neutral platform. Instead,
Facebook must proactively prevent the proliferation of hate speech and, if such efforts fail, take
substantive action to remedy the situation. Of course, any claim that Facebook ‘must’ do
something should be scrutinized. The very first page of the document explicitly states that
“nothing in these Guiding Principles should be read as creating new international law
obligations.” 9 In short, none of the bold claims of corporate responsibility or liability can be
enforced, rendering them little more than pretty words and pleasant ideas.
The challenging question of Facebook’s obligations to uphold human rights is
complicated not only by its status as a private corporation, but also by its ethereality. How does
international law operate in cyberspace? Can online behavior be juridically demonstrated to
perpetrate offline human rights abuses? Who possesses jurisdiction over the Internet, and how
can we demarcate those boundaries? These questions grew far more urgent after Facebook’s role

7. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,
2011, HR/PUB/11/04,
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf, 13.
8. Ibid, 14.
9. Ibid, 1.
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in the Rohingya genocide became clear. In its 2019 report regarding the application of human
rights law to online hate speech, the UN Special Rapporteur on Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression called out this atrocity specifically. “The
consequences of ungoverned online hate can be tragic,” the report notes, “as illuminated by
Facebook’s failure to address incitement against the Rohingya Muslim community in
Myanmar.” 10 With the Rohingya genocide as its backdrop, it lays out recommendations for both
states and companies, urging all parties to protect human rights online with the same rigor as
they do offline.
Despite this resolute opening, the report quickly grows more tepid and nebulous. The
Special Rapporteur makes a broad call for corporations to consider human rights when
addressing hate speech on their platforms, but fails to elaborate on what such a consideration
should look like. Similarly, recommendations for increased transparency regarding allowable
versus removable content neglect to provide examples, targets, or evaluative measures. More
specific injunctions fall short as well. A proposal that companies draw upon human rights law to
designate protected identities appears sound, until one realizes that no human rights law
explicitly or consistently establishes such categories. Even if such frameworks existed, this
report faces the same issue as the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; it lacks
potency. Its recommendations for corporations are just that—recommendations. The Special
Rapporteur can advise that companies take its findings under consideration, but cannot require
action or inflict consequences.

10. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Report on Online Hate Speech, October 9, 2019,
A/74/486, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/308/13/PDF/N1930813.pdf?OpenElement, 16.
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One ongoing project may solve the enforceability issues faced by other United Nations
measures. Convened annually since 2014, the Intergovernmental Working Group on
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights
represents the international community’s attempt to devise a legally binding instrument that
would regulate the activities of transnational corporations with respect to human rights. The
treaty’s current draft addresses victim rights and protections, prevention of human rights
atrocities, access to remedy, issues of legal liability, and jurisdiction. 11 If the working group ever
completes its task, the final product could possess the clout of international law. However, that is
a big ‘if.’ Given that it has taken seven years to yield a draft document, finalization and
ratification seems a distant goal.
The working group’s testudinal pace exemplifies a major drawback of transnational
policy coordination. Unifying two hundred-odd states into a coalition with a cohesive approach
towards any issue—let alone one as novel and complex as digital hate speech—represents a
major diplomatic and administrative challenge. Global governance systems are bureaucratic
behemoths, and even a successful attempt to design a legally binding regulatory instrument may
take so long as to render the final product anachronistic. These impracticalities inhibit
substantive and actionable contributions. Ultimately, the United Nations may be best positioned
to articulate values and visions, and leave the actual mitigation of Facebook hate speech to other
players.

11. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in
International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,
August 17, 2021, A/HRC/49/65/Add. 1,
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session6/LBI3rdDRAF
T.pdf.
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SOVEREIGN STATES: STRONG BUT SEPARATE ENFORCEMENT
Because the United Nations so often finds itself hamstrung by accusations of
jurisdictional overreach, sovereign entities may prove more effective regulators. Within the
limits of some very loose international agreements, states have absolute control over the relative
liberty corporations possess within their borders. Some states—such as China—severely restrict
that liberty. Though at least a partial market economy, the state retains extensive influence even
over ostensibly private enterprises; one law, for example, requires any citizen, organization, or
business to “support and cooperate in national intelligence work.” 12 The near-omnipotence of the
Chinese government gives it an easy path out of the moral and political quagmire of Facebook: it
simply avoids the quagmire entirely. Dubbed “The Great Firewall,” China operates an extensive
censorship system that blocks most social media platforms owned by Western companies—
including Facebook. 13 Despite its ubiquity throughout the rest of the world, Facebook cannot be
accessed in China without a VPN. China’s government instituted the ban in 2009 after unrest in
the heavily oppressed Xinjiang region in order to sever connections between residents and the
outside world. Eliminating Facebook in a country does, of course, eliminate Facebook hate
speech in that country. However, trading virtual vitriol for centralized censorship does not
constitute a desirable solution, and few states would be willing to risk the public backlash that
would surely follow a unilateral prohibition of the platform.
On the opposite side of the spectrum lies the United States. Fervently capitalist, beholden
to corporate interests, and seemingly allergic to federal economic regulation, the US has
12. Richard McGregor, “How the State Runs Business in China,” The Guardian, July 25, 2019,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/25/china-business-xi-jinping-communist-party-state-privateenterprise-huawei.
13. Eloise Barry, “These Are the Countries Where Twitter, Facebook and TikTok Are Banned,” Time,
January 18, 2022, https://time.com/6139988/countries-where-twitter-facebook-tiktok-banned/.
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historically dealt with hate speech on Facebook by turning a blind eye to it. The country’s
founding commitment to free expression renders any limitation on speech—even hateful
speech—a political minefield. More recently, some legislators and attorneys general have
targeted tech giants, including Facebook, for violating antitrust laws. A bipartisan coalition in the
House of Representatives has proposed bills that would place a higher burden of proof on
companies to demonstrate that planned mergers are sufficiently competitive. 14 Such a policy
would make it much more challenging for corporations to acquire and neutralize potential rivals,
as Facebook did with Instagram. Similarly, in December 2020 the Federal Trade Commission
sued the company, alleging that Facebook maintains its veritable monopoly over social
networking through anticompetitive practices. 15
Though these measures indicate unprecedented legislative bellicosity towards Big Tech,
they do not directly address hate speech. Reducing Facebook’s market power could allow for the
emergence of new social media platforms with more stringent content standards, moving users
away from Facebook and curtailing the scope and intensity of its impact. However, given that
over half of the world’s Internet users regularly access Facebook, this outcome is far from
certain. Both the Chinese and American approaches to Facebook fail to substantively address
hate speech on Facebook. In the European Union, however, proposed legislation offers
innovative and wide-ranging policies that could not only require social media companies to more

14. Cecilia Kang, “Lawmakers, Taking Aim at Big Tech, Push Sweeping Overhaul of Antitrust,” The New
York Times, June 11, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/11/technology/big-tech-antitrustbills.html#:~:text=WASHINGTON%20%E2%80%94%20House%20lawmakers%20on%20Friday,to%20monopoly
%20laws%20in%20decades.
15. Federal Trade Commission, “FTC Sues Facebook for Illegal Monopolization,” news release, December
9, 2020, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2020/12/ftc-sues-facebook-illegal-monopolization.
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assiduously remove hateful content from their platforms, but proactively prevent such content in
the first place.
Approved by the European Parliament in January 2022, the Digital Services Act (DSA)
imposes a system of rules, regulations, and penalties meant to make the Internet a safer place for
users. 16 It requires social media platforms to publicly disclose how many content moderators
they employ and what languages they speak, a direct response to Facebook’s failures in
Myanmar. Platforms would also need to establish accessible and timely mechanisms for
complaints and redress, allowing users to contest content moderation decisions. However, the
DSA recognizes that corporations’ first loyalty is to their own bottom line, not the rights and
security of their users. Therefore, the legislation would subject companies to external risk audits
and create stronger public oversight of the platforms. Unlike the United Nations, which has
published multiple reports suggesting similar measures, the European Union possesses the ability
to punish noncompliance. Corporations in violation of the Digital Services Act could face fines
of up to 10% of their global revenue. 17
Passed in tandem with the DSA, the Digital Markets Act (DMA) addresses the unjust
market systems that have allowed Facebook to accrue power virtually unchecked. The DMA
places new obligations on industry ‘gatekeepers,’ or firms that hold significant market power. It
would require companies such as Facebook to cease favoring their own products and prevent
other noncompetitive practices that quash the success of new, potentially more ethical social

16. European Parliament. “Digital Services Act: Regulating Platforms for a Safer Online Space for Users.”
News release, January 20, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220114IPR21017/digitalservices-act-regulating-platforms-for-a-safer-online-space-for-users.
17. Ibid.
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media platforms. 18 Failure to uphold these standards and comply with a fair, open digital
marketplace could provoke additional fines of up to 10% of global revenue. Enforcement of both
the DSA and DMA would rest with the European Commission, not individual European states. 19
This technicality is meant to bypass nations with lax regulations such as Ireland, where most Big
Tech companies house their European headquarters. If approved by EU Member States, the
Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act would represent the world’s most comprehensive
action against online hate speech and its offline harm.
Both of these measures build on the 2016 Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate
Speech Online. Actualizing the dual-track schemas put forth by the United Nations, the Code of
Conduct creates responsibilities for both nations and corporations. It commits IT companies to
supporting EU efforts to “respond to the challenge of ensuring that online platforms do not offer
opportunities for illegal online hate speech to spread virally.” 20 Platforms must respond
“expeditiously” to reports of hate speech—ideally within 24 hours—and maintain a high
standard of transparency regarding impermissible content and notification procedures. 21 Unlike
many other national technological policies, the Code of Conduct also obligates Internet
companies to support educational programs that build critical thinking skills, inoculating the

18. European Commission, “The Digital Markets Act: Ensuring Fair and Open Digital Markets,” accessed
December 1, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-markets-actensuring-fair-and-open-digital-markets_en.
19. Ibid.
20. European Commission. “European Union Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online.”
June 30, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racismand-xenophobia/eu-code-conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en, 1.
21. Ibid, 1.
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populace against disinformation and heuristic-induced prejudices. These measures are designed
to prevent the type of online behavior that led to the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar.
The Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online is also extrapolated from
a 2008 EU framework criminalizing certain forms of racist and xenophobic expression.
European Union member states must punish speech that is “publicly inciting to violence or
hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such group defined by reference to
race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin,” and/or “publicly condoning, denying,
or grossly trivialising” crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 22 This
wording already lends the Code of Conduct more clout than similar limitations on free speech in
the United States; it forbids not only incitement to violence, but also incitement to hatred. Issuing
this broader injunction relieves the hefty burden of proving a direct connection between digital
language and physical violence.
The initial 2008 framework also contains an article holding legal persons liable for
punishable speech. Constituting another departure from United States law, this raises the
possibility of Facebook facing culpability for hate speech posted on its platform. In the US,
infamous Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act states that “no provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.” 23 This small provision possesses massive
consequences. It essentially removes liability from any social media company for the content
hosted on their platforms, even content that is libelous, inciteful, or otherwise judicially
22. European Council, Council Framework Decision on Combating Certain Forms and Expressions of
Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law, November 28, 2008, 2008/913/JHA, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32008F0913.
23. Congress.gov, "S.314 - 104th Congress (1995-1996): Communications Decency Act of 1995," February
1, 1995, https://www.congress.gov/bill/104th-congress/senate-bill/314/, § 230.
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condemnable. Passed in 1996, the United States Congress intended Section 230 to provide the
legal wiggle room viewed as necessary for the growth of the burgeoning tech industry. 24 More
than 25 years later, however, it is evident that corporations no longer need governmental
stimulus. Where once Internet companies required protection from the public, now the public
needs protection from the Internet companies. The European Union’s Code of Conduct on
Countering Illegal Hate Speech addresses this development, recognizing that some degree of
regulation—a small sacrifice of personal liberty—may be necessary to guarantee a greater degree
of security—a realization of collective liberty. However, despite its innovative approach, the
Code of Conduct possesses significant geographical limitations. It is, after all, the ‘European
Union’s’ code, and therefore does not apply to the vast majority of the world’s population that
dwells outside of the EU. The Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act face similar
constraints. The advantage of enforceability that sovereign solutions afford comes at the cost of
universality, leaving the issue of online hate speech only spottily addressed.
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: NECESSITY OR IMPOSSIBILITY?
Reining in the harm caused by Facebook may elude governing bodies. Multilateral
institutions such as the United Nations can standardize regulations, coalescing the international
community into a united front against digital hate speech and its real-world damage. However,
such measures often lack the force of law, rendering them all but ineffective. Policies initiated by
sovereign entities such as the European Union face the inverse problem; they can impose
enforceable rules and consequences, but only within their limited jurisdictions. If each nation
were to impose distinct laws governing hate speech on social media platforms, cyberspace could

24. Electronic Frontier Foundation, “CDA 230,” Accessed February 14, 2022,
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230.
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be carved into dozens of disparate regulatory zones. Such an outcome would be not only
inconvenient, but almost inconceivable. After all, the Internet in general and social media in
particular derive their utility from their unsurpassed ability to connect individuals across the
globe. Discordant and uncoordinated policing of Facebook seems both impractical and
unpopular.
Further, both global and national governmental systems are riddled with red tape.
Drafting even limited or impotent legislation would likely take so long that it would be obsolete
by the time of ratification, forcing the process to begin anew. Technology progresses with a
rapidity utterly foreign to the halls of bureaucracy. Facebook’s algorithm—and the way users
engage with it—changes frequently, producing phenomena and potential problems that
lawmakers may not anticipate. Cumbersome legislative leviathans lack the speed and agility to
keep pace with Silicon Valley. Indeed, rapid advancement and a high tolerance for risk has
characterized Facebook ever since the company’s infancy when Zuckerberg famously exhorted
his employees to “move fast and break things.” 25 With plenty of things now broken, perhaps
only Facebook itself can move fast enough to repair them.
Once again, Myanmar provides a grim illustration for the rest of the world. Places as
diverse as India and France, Ethiopia and the United States possess high degrees of racial/ethnic
tension, exacerbated by social media and their own unique constellations of genocidal primes, as
discussed in the previous chapter. Given the ubiquity of both conflict and Facebook, what steps
can be taken to decouple the platform from its aggravation of global hatred? Any such progress
will first require Facebook to devote its resources more equitably around the world.

25. “Mark Zuckerberg's Letter to Investors: 'The Hacker Way,'” Wired, February 1, 2012,
https://www.wired.com/2012/02/zuck-letter/.
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Investigations in the aftermath of the Rohingya genocide revealed a gross negligence on the part
of the company as it aggressively pursued market expansion in Myanmar without allocating
adequate attention, funding, or staffing to its operations there. During the rapid deregulation of
media after the dissolution of the military junta, telecommunications access exploded. In 2012,
Internet penetration hovered around just 1%; by 2018, it reached 30%. 26 Simultaneously, the
price of SIM cards plunged by 99%, leading millions of Burmese citizens to purchase
smartphones—smartphones from which they could access Facebook. With its synchronized
messaging system, news content, and entertainment platform, Facebook use in Myanmar
skyrocketed. In order to capitalize on the app’s popularity, “Myanmar’s mobile phone operators
began offering a sweet deal: use Facebook without paying any data charges.” 27 The coincidence
of media liberalization, technologization, and economic incentivization produced an exponential
increase in the prevalence of Facebook. According to a Reuters investigation, Myanmar
possessed 1.2 million Facebook users in 2014. Just four years later, it had 18 million.28 Unlike in
the United States where the platform serves primarily to connect people, many people in
Myanmar utilize it as their primary news source, and even equate it with the Internet itself. 29
However, the expansion of Burmese Facebook users was not accompanied by an
expansion of Burmese Facebook infrastructure. The company had no permanent staff members
in the country, and in 2015 it employed just four Burmese-speaking content moderators to

26. Jennifer Whitten-Woodring et al., “Poison If You Don’t Know How to Use It: Facebook, Democracy,
and Human Rights in Myanmar,” The International Journal of Press/Politics 25, no. 3 (July 2020): 407–25.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161220919666.
27. Steve Stecklow, “Why Facebook is Losing the War on Hate Speech in Myanmar,” Reuters, August 15,
2018. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate/.
28. Ibid.
29. Whitten-Woodring et al., “Poison.”
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review the posts of Myanmar’s 7.3 million users. 30 Spread that thinly, the moderators had no
hope of examining every reported violation, and countless instances of anti-Rohingya content
fell through the cracks. Hate speech also benefited from a scarcity of technological resources.
Facebook’s algorithm for identifying and reporting problematic posts operates primarily in
‘global’ languages such as English, Spanish, and Mandarin, creating a language barrier that
exposes linguistic minorities to higher levels of online hatred. 31 Further, the company’s
translation technology is largely incompatible with Burmese script, producing dangerously
erroneous results. One post discovered by Reuters read in Burmese, “Kill all the kalars that you
see in Myanmar; none of them should be left alive;” the English translation rendered it as, “I
shouldn’t have a rainbow in Myanmar.” 32 The effects of such technological failures like this are
worsened by other sociopolitical dynamics within the country. “Facebook gained influence at a
time when government publications seemed to condone extreme speech and when trust in
foreign media was declining. Therefore, Facebook became popular when conditions in Myanmar
were ripe for online extreme speech to occur and for disinformation to remain unchallenged.” 33
Despite the presence of domestic upheaval, ethnic tension, and other genocidal primes, the
company did not curb the pace of its expansion in Myanmar, nor did it adjust its content
moderation strategies. Facebook’s aggressive business practices and refusal to sufficiently
resource expanding markets contributed to one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 21st
century.
30. Stecklow, “Why Facebook is Losing the War.”
31. Billy Perrigo, “Facebook Says It’s Removing More Hate Speech Than Ever Before. But There’s a
Catch,” Time, November 27, 2019, https://time.com/5739688/facebook-hate-speech-languages/.
32. Stecklow, “Why Facebook is Losing the War.”
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These shortcomings are not limited to Myanmar. Rather, they constitute a pattern within
Facebook’s global operations, demonstrating a clear prioritization of its Euro-American users. A
recent study of Facebook content in India exposed rampant disinformation and hate speech,
particularly targeted towards Muslims. India currently constitutes Facebook’s largest market,
with over 340 million regular users. However, despite the nation’s importance to the company’s
bottom line, Facebook still chooses to allocate its ample resources elsewhere. According to
internal documents, it devotes 87% of its anti-misinformation budget to the United States,
despite Americans representing only 10% of Facebook users. 34 This blatant disregard for the
majority of the global population perpetuates the hatred that already exists on the platform and
precludes the mitigation of resulting violence. Preventing another genocide like that in Myanmar
will require Facebook to invest time, funding, technology, and personnel outside the United
States.
Part of this negligence also manifests in Facebook’s ‘race-blind’ approach to content
moderation. By blinding itself entirely to historic and contemporary realities of marginalization,
the company fails to adequately protect vulnerable groups from violence seeded on its platform.
The effects of this decontextualization can be starkly seen in Myanmar. Privileging dominant
Buddhist nationalist extremists to the same degree as the disenfranchised Rohingya minority
permitted the proliferation and reinforcement of hateful rhetoric that—while perhaps not in strict
violation of the Community Standards—nevertheless engendered harm. Facebook has made
repeated assurances that it takes ‘local nuances’ such as racial slurs into consideration during the
evaluation process. However, content moderators have confessed that “the rules were

34. Frenkel, Sheera and Davey Alba. “In India, Facebook Grapples with an Amplified Version of Its
Problems.” The New York Times, November 9, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/23/technology/facebookindia-misinformation.html?referringSource=articleShare.
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inconsistent; sometimes they could make exceptions and sometimes they couldn’t.” 35 In many
instances of cultural or linguistic ambiguity, users received the benefit of the doubt and
questionable content remained on the platform. 36 If Facebook hopes to impede the repetition of
history, it must reimagine its approach to hate speech. It must recognize that cyberspace does not
exist in a vacuum, and therefore ground its Community Standards in local contexts of power,
oppression, and privilege.
Additionally, Facebook should also consider reforming the underlying design that not
merely enables but actively encourages the spread of hate speech on its platform. The piece of
technology that prophesied Facebook’s innovation and enshrined its dominance—the News Feed
algorithm—preys upon the natural human proclivity towards fear-, disgust-, or rage-inducing
content. This proclivity, known as negativity bias, “accounts for our tendency to remember
episodes of threat and fear more strongly than periods of calm and peaceful relations with other
groups.” 37 It may have begun as an adaptive strategy, but in modern times the bias leads to
individuals devoting more time, attention, and memory to negative events. Chirot and McCauley
note that this can engender intergroup conflict; group members focus more on the perceived
dangers and uncertainties posed by the ‘Other,’ creating an abstract yet pervasive sense of threat
that may incite violence. 38 Social media algorithms only exacerbate these effects. Meant to
maximize user engagement, the News Feed serves customized content to each user based on
what that individual has demonstrated an interest in or preference for. However, because human
35. Stecklow, “Why Facebook is Losing the War.”
36. Ibid.
37. Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley, Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass
Political Murder, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 64.
38. Ibid, 64-65.
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beings possess a psychological disposition towards negative information, the News Feed
disproportionately ‘dishes up’ extremist content. Subsequent adjustments to the algorithm—such
as the incorporation of Meaningful Social Interaction (MSI)—only intensified this tendency,
saturating people’s Facebook feeds with posts more likely to stoke existing racial or ethnic
tensions. 39
The MSI revision is not irreversible. In fact, when confronted with its dangers, Facebook
executives decided to scale back the News Feed’s MSI component, but only for particularly
controversial topics in particularly volatile places—including Myanmar. Despite suggestions
from internal research teams to extrapolate that decision to the rest of the platform, the company
refused to curtail MSI across the board, fearing that doing so would compromise the integrity of
what made Facebook, Facebook. 40 However, this retroactive, compartmentalized concession
remains insufficient. Confining algorithmic reform to states that have already experienced social
media-influenced ethnic conflict fails to forestall the exacerbation of genocidal primes in other
locations. Diluting MSI and implementing other systemic changes to social media platforms
would by no means eradicate the possibility of mass rape, murder, or ethnic cleansing. Yet in
light of the role of Facebook in enabling the Rohingya genocide, taking preventative action to
defang the aspects of its algorithm that embolden extremism and inspire violence constitutes a
crucial step in ensuring such atrocities do not repeat themselves.

39. Christopher Mims, "How Facebook's Master Algorithm Powers the Social Network,” The Wall Street
Journal, October 22, 2017, https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/how-facebooks-master-algorithm-powerssocial/docview/1953638742/se-2?accountid=12205.
40. Jeff Horowitz, interview with Ryan Knutson and Keach Hagey, The Facebook Files, Part 4: The
Outrage Algorithm, podcast audio, September 18, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/podcasts/the-journal/the-facebookfiles-part-4-the-outrage-algorithm/e619fbb7-43b0-485b-877f-18a98ffa773f.

88

In response to the release of the Facebook Files—a series of damning revelations about
the platform exposed by an internal whistleblower—Facebook has emphasized its commitment
to safety and security. Spokespeople have touted the billions of dollars and thousands of new
personnel that the company has devoted to the assurance of its users’ well-being. After all, as
Mark Zuckerberg said, permitting the proliferation of harmful content is “deeply illogical;” what
advertiser would pay to post ads on a platform that sparks hatred and violence? 41 Though
Zuckerberg’s argument appears rational, it stands in direct opposition to reality. Since 2017, the
year the Rohingya genocide peaked, Facebook’s annual net income has grown by more than $13
billion and its userbase has expanded to encompass 3 billion people—more than 1/3 of the
world’s population. 42 This success comes despite the company’s failure to address the structural
issues that encourage hate speech and enable genocide.
Even seemingly small changes to Facebook’s underlying technology can yield potentially
consequential impacts. Internal company studies have found that slightly reducing platform
speeds gives users a split second longer to think about what they’re posting, encouraging them to
exercise greater prudence. One surprising and controversial way to do this, the research team
discovered, is to remove the reshare button. They found that doing so led to “huge gains off the
bat,” but Facebook would never condone such a radical step, even one proven to significantly
mitigate harm on its platform. 43 However, less extreme measures can also produce similar
results. Other potential solutions include limiting how many invitations a group can send or
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42. Statista, “Facebook's Revenue and Net Income from 2007 to 2020,” accessed November 6, 2021,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/277229/facebooks-annual-revenue-and-net-income/.
43. Horowitz, The Outrage Algorithm.
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comments an individual can post in a day. These schemes are known within Facebook as “break
glass measures”—ideas the company knows about, suspects could work, and could deploy at any
time, but refuses to enact. 44
This represents the greatest shortcoming of harm mitigation efforts that depend upon
corporate responsibility; Facebook has repeatedly demonstrated its unwillingness to take
inconsequential hits to its revenue even when doing so would increase the safety and wellbeing
of its users. Its pattern of behavior suggests a pervasive devaluation of human rights. A change in
policy and practice, therefore, may require a change in the corporate culture, which in turn may
require a change in the highest echelons of Facebook’s leadership. Removing Mark Zuckerberg
and installing a new CEO could reprioritize people over profit.
Separating the inventor from his invention, however, may prove difficult. Former
Facebook chief security officer Alex Stamos notes that the company’s top leadership has
remained essentially the same since it went public in 2012, and the calcification of turnover
“[creates] kind of this bubble where Zuckerberg gets to be detached.” 45 As a Harvard dropout
with a brilliant technological mind and limited life experience, Zuckerberg surrounded himself
with veterans of marketing, management, and lobbying. Many of these veterans continue to
comprise Facebook’s elite inner circle. They tend to shield Zuckerberg from the harsh realities of
his platform, a dynamic which does not seem to perturb Zuckerberg himself. “He's okay being in
this bubble of people who are telling him, you know, not necessarily what he wants to hear, but

44. Ibid.
45. Jon Favreau, interview with Alex Stamos, Offline: Alex Stamos on Leaving Facebook and Zuckerberg’s
Reign, podcast audio, January 9, 2022, https://crooked.com/podcast/alex-stamos-on-leaving-facebook-andzuckerbergs-reign/.

90

they are formatting things in the way he wants them to be,” Stamos contends. 46 Shaking up
Facebook’s executive roster may overhaul its culture more broadly, reprioritizing human rights
even if it means slight losses to their growth rate.
Further, a change in leadership could serve as a means of redesigning the corporate
structure. “There's a couple of…fundamental organizational flaws at Facebook,” Stamos
observes, “that I think are real problems.” 47 Human rights and information security concerns fall
under the purview of the communications and policy teams, which have historically erred on the
side of less transparency. Stamos recommends that Facebook divorce its integrity and security
departments from comms and policy in order to preserve an independent human rights approach.
If unmired from the swamp of public relations and obsessive growth, such an approach could
actually prioritize the safety and wellbeing of the platform’s users.
Of course, there is no guarantee that installing a new CEO would tangibly reform
Facebook’s culture or its policy. Zuckerberg’s successor could prove even less invested in
preserving human rights and may worsen rather than ameliorate violations on the platform. Even
if they possessed a commitment to expanding the company’s focus beyond growth and revenue
production, a top-down transformation may not prove effective. The corporate culture may be
too deeply ingrained for a mere change in leadership to alter it. At the very least, an executive
shake-up would require either the acquiescence of Zuckerberg himself or the exhortation of
Facebook’s board of directors. Both seem unlikely. Though enhanced privacy requirements from
smartphone companies—not to mention the rocky debut of Meta as Facebook’s futuristic parent
company—have sent the company’s stock into a tailspin, investors are snapping up shares,

46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
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betting on significant long-term growth. 48 With that kind of market optimism, a replacement of
the CEO seems unlikely. Unless and until Facebook faces enduring legal or financial
consequences for its actions, internal corporate responsibility measures will remain weak and
performative.

48. Ryan Vlastelica, “Meta’s Stock-Market Wipeout Is Unmatched in the Megacap Era,” Bloomberg,
February 18, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-18/meta-s-collapse-is-unmatched-in-the-eraof-big-tech-tech-watch; Fitri Wulandari, “Meta Platforms Stock Forecast: Will Metaverse Drive FB Higher?”
Capital.com, March 18, 2022, https://capital.com/meta-platforms-fb-stock-forecast.
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CONCLUSION
Call it ingenuity, call it hubris, call it human nature—whichever your preferred
explanation, the world has achieved a breathtaking stage of technological advancement.
Innovation has always intended to ease and improve our lives, but its purpose now seems almost
soteriological; we need invention to soothe our imperfect world, we need progress to save us
from ourselves. It was not so long ago that Facebook felt that way. I remember when friends and
family began making accounts and we realized that it enabled us to connect with each other
despite miles between us. On a dauntingly expansive planet, social media makes our loved ones
feel close. Eventually, Facebook came to represent hope for a liberated world order as activists
took to cyberspace to dissolve calcified hierarchies, empower historically marginalized groups,
and build a transnational vision of a just and equitable society. It seemed the technology would
once again offer a means of salvation.
Yet in recent years, it has become clear that while Facebook may serve as a tool for
humanity to fight its inner demons, it also actively exploits those demons for profit. Zuckerberg
and other company executives introduced a product that preyed upon human tendencies towards
negativity, divisiveness, and radicalism. Worse, they did so in volatile sociopolitical
environments with little knowledge nor care for local contexts of power and oppression.
Facebook posits that it simply provides a neutral platform for individuals to freely express
themselves, but such claims disingenuously mask the way that the platform’s algorithm
intentionally amplifies sensational, even inflammatory content. It does not create social tensions
out of nothing, but it can exacerbate those that already exist. This process was tragically
exemplified by the Burmese military’s Facebook hate speech campaign and the resulting
Rohingya genocide. Despite the well-founded connection between the company’s technology,
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policies, and resource prioritization and the unspeakable violence in Myanmar, there has been
little concerted global, national, or corporate effort to address the issue of hate speech on social
media.
Over the two-year journey of writing this thesis, I have reflected often upon my personal
relationship with Facebook. I still do not have an account on that platform nor any of its
affiliates, in large part due to moral reservations that only intensified as I delved into my
research. But my stubborn refusal to join my 3.7 billion fellow human beings on social media
does not force Facebook to improve its dismal human rights record; indeed, it has often distanced
me from the movements fighting to make the world—both virtual and physical—a safer place for
those most harmed by digital hate speech. Even if I succumb neither to convenience nor friendly
coercion and go the remainder of my life without a Facebook account, social media is now
inextricably intertwined with the future of human civilization. We felt this viscerally on October
4, 2021. On that day, the world ground to a halt, half the global population reeling from an
unforeseeable shockwave. Communications quieted and commerce stuttered as Facebook and its
associated platforms—WhatsApp, Instagram, and Messenger—disappeared for five hours. 1 In
this brief time, the company lost $50 billion in market value and caused incalculable damage to
small businesses that depend on social media for sales and communities that depend on social
media as the Internet. 2 The outage sparked conversation about the world’s potentially dangerous

1. Mike Isaac and Sheera Frenkel, “Gone in Minutes, Out for Hours: Outage Shakes Facebook,” The New
York Times, October 8, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/04/technology/facebook-down.html.
2. Mark Sweney, “Facebook Outage Highlights Global Over-reliance on its Services,” The Guardian,
October 5, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/oct/05/facebook-outage-highlights-global-overreliance-on-itsservices#:~:text=The%20fallout%20of%20Facebook's%20unprecedented,m%20of%20the%20advertising%20dollar
s.
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social, commercial, and psychological reliance on Facebook. However, it also demonstrated
beyond doubt that social media in general—and Facebook in particular—is here to stay.
Its permanence does not give it a free pass to violate human rights. Quite the opposite: it
makes it all the more critical to maximize Facebook’s potential to help while minimizing its
tendency to harm. Doing so will require updating both legal and ethical frameworks to align with
a deeply technologized and interconnected world. Zuckerberg and his fellow executives
conceived of the social media network in a milieu of unregulated free speech and capitalism that
fostered breakneck innovations and the absolute valuation of individual rights. These qualities
are seen as fundamental features of Facebook. In many ways, they enabled the platform’s
meteoric rise to social success and economic dominance. However, Facebook’s single-minded
quest for connection actually sows division, encouraging people to bond over hatred and
prejudice, and ultimately amplifying discord and difference.
After its highly publicized rebranding in 2021, Facebook—now known as ‘Meta,’—
incorporated language pledging itself to values of equity, justice, and service. It vows to “give
people a voice,” to “serve everyone, build connection and community, and keep people safe” as
it carries out its mission to “bring the world closer together.” 3 In order to accomplish this, the
company has adopted the slogan: “move fast with stable infrastructure.” 4 Of course, this
somewhat uninspiring motto harkens back to the early years of Facebook, when Zuckerberg
famously urged his employees to “move fast and break things”—break the status quo, break

3. “Company Info,” Meta, accessed March 19, 2022, https://about.facebook.com/company-info/.
4. Isabel Asher Hamilton, “Mark Zuckerberg's New Values for Meta Show He Still Hasn't Truly Let Go of
‘Move Fast and Break Things,’” Business Insider, February 16, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/meta-markzuckerberg-new-values-move-fast-and-break-things-2022-2.
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expectations, break the bounds of what we are told is possible. Ironically, putting things back
together again may require returning to that old mantra. To repair the damage caused by hate
speech and other human rights violations on Facebook, the world must once more break things—
break up monopolies, break with legal precedent, break racialized systems of power. Though it
seems paradoxical, the decentralization and democratization that social media offers would
empower such a movement; holding platforms accountable for their misdeeds may prove
impossible without the platforms themselves.
In fact, some have already tried that strategy. Over 1000 companies and activist groups
united in July of 2020 under the hashtag #StopHateforProfit and boycotted placing their ads on
Facebook. The campaign intended to “pressure Facebook into taking more stringent steps to stop
the spread of hate speech and misinformation on its platform,” drawing major corporate names
including Coca-Cola, Verizon, and HP. 5 Their unprecedented stance grabbed international
headlines. However, rampant speculation that the boycott would significantly damage
Facebook’s earnings and force it to strengthen its human rights policy did not bear out. Most
companies returned to the platform within a month, and an analysis following the campaign
found that lost brand revenue represented less than 1% of third quarter growth. 6 Despite a
concerted effort by some of the world’s most influential businesses, no substantive policy change
emerged; participants in the boycott were unable or unwilling to truly divorce themselves from
social media advertisements, and the public has largely forgotten about #StopHateForProfit.

5. Megan Graham, “Zuckerberg was Right: Ad Boycotts Won’t Hurt Facebook That Much,” CNBC,
August 4, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/04/some-major-companies-will-keep-pausing-facebook-ads-asboycott-ends.html.
6. Ibid.
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Clearly, Facebook has grown too powerful to be financially coerced into better behavior.
The solution may rest upon some of the very qualities that enable the platform’s human rights
violations, namely its unmatched ability to share sensational content across physical and social
barriers. For years, activists have turned to social media networks to raise awareness for civil
rights campaigns, foment resistance against authoritarian regimes, and demand justice for
historically oppressed peoples. Despite my conscious disinvolvement in Facebook, I am familiar
with these tactics. In the brief time that I have been writing this thesis, I have witnessed countless
transformative protest movements originate, expand, and organize on social media. Native
activists in the United States—particularly my home in Minnesota—have used Facebook and its
kin to bring the world’s attention to missing and murdered Indigenous women. Their Facebook
page has almost 150,000 followers, a huge step in combating the apathy that allows such
atrocities to persist. 7 The decentralized nature of social media facilitates coordination between
the national nonprofit and aligned grassroots movements, building a diverse coalition that does
not depend on a single individual or hierarchy to ensure its continued existence. Instead, the
movement grows from countless roots and nodes. Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women’s
social media organizing encourages the sharing of strategies, networks, and radical imaginings.
This principle is exemplified by the Hong Kong protests of 2019—2020. After China
passed an aggressive extradition bill undermining the ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement
that preserved Hong Kong’s nominal sovereignty, thousands of people took to the streets. For
months, protesters staged audacious actions, garnering international support. Drawing inspiration
from the Arab Spring, the protest “exhibited certain features of modern, decentralized,

7. Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women USA (@mmiwusa). Facebook page, accessed April 4, 2022.
https://www.facebook.com/mmiwusa/.
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‘networked’ social movements: the refusal of leadership, the decentralization of protest
activities, and the instrumental reliance on social media-based communication.” 8 Just as Missing
and Murdered Indigenous Women have done, the Hong Kong activists rejected hierarchical
organization in favor of “participatory horizontality” that leveraged spontaneous and
decentralized decision-making to maximize action impact while minimizing risks to privacy and
security. 9 Movements were coordinated, tactics negotiated, and messages communicated via
social media. In a battle for freedom against a regime notorious for its omniscient surveillance
and harsh crackdowns, the ability of platforms like Facebook to foster both anonymity and unity
is critical. It seems unlikely that the Hong Kong protests would have proven so effective without
the use of digital social networks.
Social media not only enabled the sharing of tactics and rhetoric within the activist
networks in Hong Kong, but to other movements across the world. As I write this from the Twin
Cities, my community continues to see regular uprisings against racist policing, driven by the
murders of Philando Castile, Jamar Clark, George Floyd, Daunte Wright, and so many others.
Many Black Lives Matter organizers adopt strategies directly from their counterparts in Hong
Kong. Scholars classify this phenomenon as “mimetic piggybacking,” observing that shared
videos and images serve as informal ‘how-to’ guides for protesting unjust or authoritarian
systems. 10 Though social justice activists have long drawn inspiration from their predecessors,
“the social internet has sped up a long history of direct and indirect dialogue between protest

8. Silvia Frosina, “Digital Revolution: How Social Media Shaped the 2019 Hong Kong Protests,” Italian
Institute for International Political Studies, June 9, 2021, https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/digitalrevolution-how-social-media-shaped-2019-hong-kong-protests-30756.
9. Ibid.
10. Tracy Ma, Natalie Shutler, Jonah E. Bromwich, and Shane O’Neill, “Why Protest Tactics Spread Like
Memes,” The New York Times, July 31, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/style/viral-protest-videos.html.
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movements around the world.” 11 I have seen countless examples of this with my own eyes:
protesters covering tear gas canisters with traffic cones, batting away flash-bang grenades with
tennis rackets, and organizing defensive walls of umbrellas to ward off projectiles. Thanks to
social media, such tactics have been used from Hong Kong to Minneapolis, Catalonia to
Kurdistan.
Despite the intentional ways that Facebook’s algorithm and executives have encouraged
the proliferation of racialized hate speech—and, by extension, racialized violence—the platform
nevertheless serves as a powerful tool for demanding justice. And many of the same qualities
that enable unspeakable atrocities also empower inspiring resistance. The company’s
uncompromising commitment to free speech permits harm to marginalized groups, yet prevents
government censorship of popular opinion. Anonymity afforded by digital avatars licenses
impunity both for those seeking to oppress others, and those seeking to liberate them.
Transcendence of geographic and temporal boundaries creates space for simmering social
tensions to boil over, and for burgeoning social movements to spread. Holding Facebook
accountable for the physical repercussions of its digital content is of paramount importance, and
ironically Facebook itself may represent the best tool to do so. In order to fight for
transformative change both online and off, we must indeed move fast and break things.

11. Ibid.
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